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Cover: Junius R. Sloan, American (1827-1900)
The Knitting Lesson (1866), oil on canvas, 18 11116" x
15 11116." Bequest of Percy H. Sloan. This small
painting is typical of many American works of the period, depicting ordinary life in rural settings. Most of
Sloan's output is housed in the collection of the VU
Museum of Art, which originated with the bequest of
the artist's son, Percy Sloan.
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INLUCETUA
Lessons
This issue of The Cresset, published with the sponsorship of the Lilly Endowment, Inc., for the local program of
Lilly Fellows in Humanities and the Arts, again arises from
the Fall Conference, held last October here at Valparaiso.
The topic, "Spirituality and Higher Education," received
attention in three major presentations, which are reproduced here. But because it is our sense that many of our
readers are engaged in their own versions of a widespread
national process of thought about the meaning of education today, this issue hopes to accomplish more than simply
to reproduce these speeches, excellent as they were.
Rather, we wanted to gather material that will establish a
context for readers to reflect personally on the questionsthe very profound questions-those presentations
addressed.
To that end, we have included not only the book
reviews which contribute to the discussion of meaning in
education, but we have trusted in the Lilly Program's
expressed conviction that the arts enable us to discover
truths in ways that are inaccessible, or perhaps not readily
expressible in the more usual methods of academic discourse. In his essay on Denise Levertov's spiritual development as a poet, Jim Champion not only explores the
subject, but demonstrates what the faithful heart, in concert with the trained eye, can do in understanding and writing about poetry. Robert Siegel has contributed two poems
that not only mean something, but describe how meaning
can be tracked and even captured.
My own contemplation has been moved ahead by a
consideration of two paintings, one of which is reproduced
on our cover. American Junius R. Sloan painted "The
Knitting Lesson," in 1866; it is one of the items in a large
collection of his works in the VU Museum of Art. Sloan,
who worked a good part of his life in Illinois, painted a
number of genre scenes, though he may well have preferred his nature paintings, deriving as they did from the
higher-toned Hudson River school.
I have often looked at this painting with affection, but
never more than I did this spring when I saw it in my
mind ' s eye while actually looking at a reproduction of
Rembrandt's "The Anatomy Lesson of Doctor Tulp."
Painted in 1632 for the Surgeons' Guild, this picture now
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hangs in the Museum of the Hague, and appears in nearly
every book about Rembrandt's work. A rather grim exercise in civic memorializing, it celebrates the accomplishments of the chief city anatomist of Amsterdam, roughly
the equivalent of the L.A. County Coroner and the Head
of Surgery at UCLA Medical Center. It shows a cadaver
stretched out on a table--glowing somewhat decadentlywhile the doctor, having apparently just opened up the
arm, pulls back its outer layers to display the muscle and
bone structures to the group of eager guild members and
science-lovers around the table.
I must have been captured by the fact that both
works use the word "Lesson" in their titles. A year of participation in the Lilly Fellows Colloquium, with its explicit
study of the nature of teaching and its relation to spirituality, surely made me more sensitive to any depiction of
lessons. Both paintings were familiar to me, but as I suddenly saw them together, their meanings for me began to
shift. I began to see in them how two versions of the
meaning of teaching might conflict
It might be mentioned first that neither lesson concerns abstractions or ideas. Both are practical demonstrations rather than philosophical reflective discourses. Both
pictures include the same three things: a student (or group
of students), a teacher, and an object ofleaming.
The contrasts could hardly be more impressive. The
doctor stands slightly apart from the watchers, in a vaulted
hall of formal proportions. The grandmother sits in a
rocker in a somewhat untidy room with the little girl at her
elbow. The doctor holds an instrument, and with it touches the cadaver, gesturing with his left hand. The grandmother holds her snuff pouch, but the girl holds the
knitted object, her hands grasping the needles. Of the
doctor's hearers, three look out of the painting at the viewer, two look at the doctor, and two look down at the
opened arm. Both grandmother and girl look at the knitted object.
Perhaps it does not need to be mentioned that one is
a great painting and the other is not. Or that in one picture, all the characters are male, and in the other, female.
One lesson concerns science and medicine, the other a
domestic skill. In the Sloan painting, clear emphasis is put
3

on the transmission of something from one generation to
the next, whereas the Rembrandt shows a group of fairly
similar colleagues, one of whom, judging by his distinct
dress, and his physical position over against the object,
knows more than the others.
I do not mean to suggest that we would all agree
about the meanings I have begun to read in these pictures.
But it seems to me that our discourses about teaching, or at
least our structures for teaching in the university, reflect
the values represented in the Rembrandt. The teacherremoved, cool and dignified--dignifies learning. The subject being taught is important. How do we read this? In
part because all the people involved are male and white
and prosperous. But to get stuck here would be to miss a
much more important point.
I am strongly aware that, in the Rembrandt, the
object is dead. If I forget what I have been taught to see,
(that is, anatomy is an important thing to learn, therefore
the tabu against mutilating the dead has to be set aside) it
is an altogether odd image-all these interested, welldressed men gathered around the very dead, very
undressed man. And one of the most amazing things about
the painting I learned only recently by reading footnotes:
not only are the names of the guild members known, so is
the name of the corpse, an executed criminal named
Andriaen Adriaensz, known as het kint, or, as the footnote
informs me, "the child."
But of course we are not, as viewers, meant to focus
on this dead body. We have learned to see here the
advancement of learning, the rise of humanism, the forward thrust of analytic knowledge, the classical trajectory
of scientific investigation. But for me its title reverberates
and reconnects with the scene in the kitchen: The Lesson.
I suspect that most of us mark the comparison with some
unease. Something resists seeing in Sloan's painting a possible model for university teaching and learning. And the
extent of that resistence, I suppose, defines a denial that
learning and teaching could be-must be- human activity
carried on in love, for humane purposes having more to do
with our ability to survive together than with our expertise
at analyzing the "dead child" of what we call culture and
knowledge.

0
The two paintings were part of what I was thinking
about when, in the Lilly Fellows Colloquium this year, we
saw a film by Francois Truffaut called The Wild Child. Based
on a case documented by a French intellectual reformer
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named Itard, the film imaginatively recreates a sequence of
events when a wild boy was found in the forests near
Aveyron, in France, in 1799. Though conventional treatment at the time would have condemned the boy to live as
a freak show, Itard's Enlightenment principles made him
ask to have the boy committed to his care. At his country
estate, Itard attempted to teach Victor the rudiments of civilization- dress, manners, and language.
Truffaut, who cast himself as the philosopher-pedagogue, gives us scene after scene during which Victor and
Itard struggle to communicate. Because Victor cannot
speak in words, and seems unresponsive to words of any
kind, the process oflearning language is agonizing. Itard is
patient but dogged. He cares about the process, and
records each small step. (The film is based on Itard's journals.) These frustrating bouts of benevolent, but unsuccessful education are interrupted by sequences in which Itard's
housekeeper, Madame Guerin, shelters the boy from the
relentless educational process, and teaches him things he
needs to know-how to hold a spoon, how to ask for milkby responding to his need rather than to the philosophe's
program.
The discussion of this film by a collection of academics proved awkward. We were unahppy with the artificiality of Itard's undertaking, yet it is an article offaith with
us that Victor was "better off" learning to be civilized. He
needed educating. Certainly we all responded to the catalogue of methods used by Itard, and analyzed so scrupulously by him in his journals and his reports to the proper
authorities in Paris. Yet, in what way was Victor better off?
How can discipline function to bring about improvement
through the infliction of pain? What sort of pain is permissible, and for what reasons? How much "learning" is merely
the successful imitation of something the teacher has decided
is important, and how much is genuinely necessary? What
attitude of the heart must make the relationship of teacher to
learner?
We had no consensus. But we did generate some brief
written comments on these subjects, and I have used some of
them throughout this issue. My thanks to the members of the
Colloquium who contributed, as well as those writers whose
longer works make this issue so stimulating, informative and
beautiful. This is a remarkable collection. May it engage your
mind and spirit in these summer months.
Peace,

GME

The Cresset

SPIRITUALITY AND
HIGHER LEARNING: THINKING AND LOVING
Roberta L. Bondi
What is the relationship between the life of the
intellect and the life of the spirit? This is a complex and
painful question. In this paper I would like to approach
the problem, not by jumping into the middle to answer the
whole of it, but by pondering with you only one part of it
having to do with what it means for a Christian to think
rationally. As members of our own culture, all of us have
been reared to believe at some level that even for the
Christian, intellect and spirit are and need to be kept separate. A good deal of my education, even my Christan education, over the years, and yours too, I suspect, was based in
the conviction that our human minds are only really trustworthy, that is, "objective," when we are able to discard
from our thought processes our own particular, individual
perceptions of the world, our own particular experiences,
our own particular points of view, and our own values. In
short, in order to meet the criteria of acceptable thought
we have not only tried to make a division between intellect
and the spiritual. We have actually tried to throw out of
our definition of what it means to think a good deal of
what we know and who we are as human beings and as
Christians. In order to help us think about this, I would
like to tell a story. It is my story, but I tell it because I suspect large parts of it are your story as well.

Roberta Bondi, Professor of Church History at the Candler
School of Theology of Emory University, has also taught at the
University of Notre Dame. She is a member of the steering committee of the working group on the apostolic faith, Commission on
Faith and Order, National Council of Churches. Her three previous books, most recently To Pray and To Love: Conversations
on Prayer with the Early Church, have brought the study of the
early church piety and theology to an enormous new audience.
This address, which she delivered at the Lilly Fellows Conference
'92, will appear in a different form in her forthcoming book, A
Book About God: Theological Reflection on an
Autobiography, to be published l7y Abingdon Press.
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One Friday morning in the winter of 1950 when I
was in the fourth grade in P.S. 41, I went with the other
forty members of my class to a movie in the school auditorium. Apart from the quizzes we inevitably had afterwards,
which I would nearly always fail from daydreaming through
them, I liked the school movies. Being about the progress
of Mankind in industry, one way or another, they were all
the same. Moving pistons, spinning vats of dough, crashing
looms, and clacking printing presses whirred against a
background of speeding music and virile voices. Sunk
down in my seat with my feet up and my arms around my
knees, I felt the presence of a huge man, dressed in a blue
over-all with red stitching on the pockets, striding across
the mechanized farms of the Great Plains of America into
distant hills. The movies made me proud to be a human
being.
This Friday started out like all the other Fridays. The
movie was on the mining, processing and use of coal.
Because it talked about fossils, however, I didn't daydream
as much as usual. Coal was made from the compressed
bodies of dinosaurs and giant ferns long dead, from slithering and flying creatures no longer found on earth. I loved
the idea of fossils.
The film had begun wonderfully. By the time we
were taken a mile below the earth's crust and into the
blackness to witness the enormous underground drill, however, my stomach was going around with it. All of a sudden
it was obvious: if coal were only made from long gone
plants and animals, the amount of coal on earth had to be
limited. If no more coal could ever be made, then the time
would come when human beings would run out of coal.
There would be no more pulsing machines, no more electricity, no more big vats of dough. Houses would have no
heat; people would have no food. Maybe mothers and
fathers would leave their children.
Normally, I was too shy and sullen ever to ask a question to class, but today when the lights came on, I truly
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leaned into the Question and Answer Time. I straightened
out of my slouch and raised my hand. Miss Jason called on
me: "You there, in the fifth row."
I stood up. "What will happen when the coal runs
out?" I asked.
Miss Jason was disconcerted. She looked at me fiercely, the inside corners of her eye-brows touching. "What do
you mean?" she answered. "The world will never run out of
coal."
"But Miss Jason," I persisted, as I saw the five boroughs of New York City, my home, spread out before me,
dark and empty. "That can't be true if all the dinosaurs are
already dead. Sooner or later, we'll have to use up the
coal!"
"Sit down right now and be quiet," she ordered.
"Believe me; be reasonable. I am telling you, we will never
run out of coal."
I slid back down on my backbone, humiliated and
angry, confused and guilty. I had gotten in trouble in
school again. I couldn't be reasonable. I couldn't figure
out how not to believe what seemed so obvious.
This happened to me all the time. Once, at recess,
for example, I came out late to find the girls from my class
by the high wire fence at the back of the playground,
behind the slides. They were in little clumps, whispering
and looking over their shoulders.
"What's going on?" I whispered, too.
"Did you notice Carolyn isn't in school today?"
Rosanna, who was precocious, answered. "When Carolyn
came home yesterday her mother was lying in the hall and
there was blood everywhere and she wouldn't wake up. I
know this is true because Carolyn told me she had to clean
up all the blood!" The other girls nodded.
"Yes, an ambulance came and they took her to the
hospital!" another girl whose name I forget added.
Everyone looked solemn, with the self-importance of knowing something only the adults were supposed to know, and
a bit frightened as well.
"Where did the blood come from?" I had to ask.
They looked at each other. "We can't figure it out,"
said Miriam, but "but when Carolyn asked her father he got
mad and told her to mind her own business. I asked my
mother, and all she will say is that I'll know when I'm
older."
Before we had a chance at further speculation, Miss
Jason stomped up to us in her lace-up school-teacher shoes.
She clapped her hands. "All right, girls," she said, "I'm not
going to tell you any more to stop talking about Carolyn's
mother. Now get out there and play!"
I never did learn what had happened to Carolyn's
mother. I assume now that she had a miscarriage, and I
suppose she must have lived. I began, however, to have sus-
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picions about the durability of my own mother. Mter a few
sleepless nights, I finally asked Mama as cautiously as I
could, without mentioning Carolyn's mother, "what will
happen to Freddie and me if you die?"
"Oh," she replied, "I won't die till you are an old
woman."
"But what if you get sick?" I wanted to know. "What if
you have a car crash?"
"I already told you. I'm not going to get sick, and I'm
not going to get in a wreck!" she said, firmly.
"But how can you know?" I cried, by this time, really
anguished.
To which she irritably replied, I suspect, with the
answer mothers through the ages have given to the questions mothers cannot face from their children. "I just
know. That's howl Now, go out and play and get some
fresh air." I slunk out in a rage of frustration and anxiety.
As I grew, an increasing number of my struggles of
this sort were connected with being a female child. Every
night after supper, for example, I would help with the dishes while my brother Fred would build things with his erector set. I thought this was terribly unfair. "Why do I have
to do the dishes, while Freddie gets to play?" I would ask.
"Because you are a girl and he is a boy," my mother would
answer (I would not have dared complain in front of my
father). Everyone seemed to take it for granted that male
privilege corresponded to a reasonable law of nature based
in female inferiority: my father, probably like every other
father in the apartment complex, nightly brought home
jokes about pushy and emotional broads at work who
couldn't think. The boys in our neighborhood spoke of
girls in just the same way: "girls are disgusting; girls are crybabies; girls are dumb."

This was the story of the intellectual life of my childhood. Before I could catch myself I was always making
observations or asking questions that didn't fit with what
the adults were telling me about the way things were, and I
didn't know how to make sense of the differences between
the simple answers they gave me and the messy or ambiguous possibilities I saw under my nose. I was certainly smart
enough to know that it was unlikely that I would be right
about something and the entire adult world wrong, but
what was I supposed to do with my own knowledge and
experience? I thought I must be crazy. I was afraid of my
thought processes, because they got me in trouble and
drove people away.
This was also the story of the "spiritual" life of my
childhood. From the summer revival sermons at my grandmother's Pond Fork Baptist Church and my weekly attendance at Calvinistic Sunday Schools I worked out early that
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there was something about God that made any sort of speculation about God risky. There, I had learned that God
said he loved me. But how could I believe God loved me?
I was always in trouble with adults for my questions, and
God the creator was the power and might behind adult
authority. God wanted me to believe what I was told.
Indeed, God was so serious about this that God sentjesus,
God's own child, to die on a cross to make me believe. If I
believed as God commanded, I would go to heaven . If I
sinned by not believing, I would go to hell. I was terrified
of Jesus, frightened witless by a God I couldn't believe in
and who asked me not to be who I was, not to know what I
knew and who gave me no way to obey.
As I grew into adolescence, these problems did not go
away. Indeed, anxiety and guilt about my inability to put
aside my own perceptions in order to "believe," to see
things "rationally" only grew worse.
Help seemed to me to be at hand when I fell in love
at fourteen with a beautiful blond boy named Herbert. (In
those days, love was the answer to a girl's every problem.)
Like me, Herbert was in the band and the orchestra-he
played French horn, I played flute-and like me, he read
books nobody else read and asked questions nobody else
asked. He was funny, and smart, and full of energy. I
could hardly take my eyes off him.
The most wonderful thing about him, however, was
his family and the way they liked me and welcomed me into
it. Both of Herbert's parents had grown up in old New
England Unitarian families. His father was an academic
scientist, a biochemist who moved purposefully, correcting
his sons in the same calm, unanguished voice in which he
discussed biochemistry. His mother was an intelligent,
decisive, and absolutely no-nonsense woman. She knew
everything there was to know about art, music, literature,
old movies, psychology, math, and history. She was also
able to make anything, including her husbands' perfectly
tailored sport-coats, the sleek, modern salmon colored
sofas upon which they sat in their elegant gray living room,
and the intricate silver knives and forks with which they ate.
Unable as I felt myself to be to escape from the ambiguity of the pain, isolation and guilt of my own intellectual,
emotional, and religious childhood struggles, what
Herbert's family had to offer seemed wonderful. Above all,
they believed in Reason. This was not reason as it had been
defined in my childhood, that is, as what the grown-ups
told you anybody with any sense who wanted to be good
believed on faith. Rather, "reason" meant logic. It was literally, no-nonsense. Reason was for the purpose of solving
problems and knowing things. Only what could be worked
out by the universal laws of logical reason could be true,
and thus real. The laws of modern physics and chemistry
were true. Mathematics was true . Human progress was
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true. Reason was, above all, clean.
The enemy of reason in that household was "traditional" religion. Traditional religion was illogical, authoritarian and impeding of progress, and thus, by definition,
not true. This sounded good to me. Ifl could believe it, in
the name of truth and science I could escape the murky
and guilt-inducing claims of my childhood God which were
so mixed in for me with all the other things I had strained
against my own judgment to believe when I was small. In
exchange for isolation in the chaos of my tortured, guilty
inability to identify the real I would receive a well-structured and shining world of rationality. I would no longer
have to live in guilt and pain. I could become an independent thinker.
During the next three years of high school I loved the
Taylors more passionately than reason would allow, and I
tried my best to embrace the rational as they did. I was not
more than half successful, of course. Faith, even
Enlightenment faith, is never simply the result of the exercise of logic. The deep beliefs we are called to in childhood are not abandoned all at once, even if we never did
fully accept them in the first place. At the same time,
observation and reflection on what I could see for myself
continued to make me unable to believe that life was so
transparently, cleanly simple as objective reason made it
out to be. Nevertheless, by the time Herbert and I broke
up when I was seventeen, even with my doubts, I was more
convinced than not. I had an extravagant longing to be
trained in the ways and wonders of Western Civilization.
College and later, seminary, were happy to do the
job. The world of the university was populated by a whole
society of people prepared to induct me more fully into the
ethos of "the life of the mind" and teach me its nuances.
As it had been for Herbert's family, the foundation of that
ethos was a commitment to reason, that is, to a model of
learning and knowing based in the logical methodology of
the hard sciences. This was not new.
Now, I was taught explicitly for the first time that the
opposite and enemy of reason was emotion. Where reason
was objective, and universally verifiable, emotion was dangerously subjective, belonging to the misleading realm of
personal, particular experience. Only by stripping away
emotional responses to particular people or problems was
it possible to arrive at the truth. That my own emotions
and experience so often stood in opposition to the conclusions of reason did not mean that those conclusions should
be re-examined. It meant that my emotions and experience were to be discounted.
At the same time, I learned a new way to think about
the moral life. According to Kant, as we learned in
Philosophy 101, a person of principle never lied, even in
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order to save the life of an innocent person, for to make an
exception in one case meant to open the flood-gates of
social distrust and chaos. To be moral meant to lay aside
the distorting private pulls of pity, preference and the particular for the sake of the rational and austere sternness of
universal law. Ethics was about justice, and justice, like the
rationality of which it was an expression, was blind.
Soon, in the ethos of the seminary, I would learn
how God fit into all this, that is cleanly, unambiguously,
and at a civilized distance. There, it would be suggested to
me that God, as the source of the structures of reality, was
Universal Reason. God was "the ground of our being" who
"accepted us in spite of our unacceptability." But God was
not interested in the sins or sufferings of individuals.
God's concern was with the human race, and that concern
was for social justice. God did not break the laws of nature
for the sake of the inner or outer pain of individuals.
Intercessory prayer might do good for the person praying,
but it did not move God at all. Intercessory prayer was
superstitious, anthropomorphic, subjective, and even self..
ish. God does not miraculously heal people from cancer,
or help children fmd lost dogs.
As for Jesus, he was a far cry from Pond Fork Baptist
church's "personal Lord and savior" who died to make me
believe as I was told. He was Lord, yes, in so far as he
showed forth the Kingdom and gave us a perfect example
of how to live into it by sharing with us in all significant
human experience. Butjesus was only a man. The virgin
birth, the miracle stories, the resurrection-all this was
merely the mythological language of the early church,
from which we needed to extract the universal truth.
I embraced this university ethos with eagerness. It
was so optimistic, and it offered such freedom. It valued
asking questions and challenging received truths about the
world. Its refusal to take the emotional and the personal
seriously promised protection against my fears and anxieties. It was so clean, its answers so unambiguous, so natural. Fear of death? Death is the natural end of life. Guilt
over sex? Sex is as natural as eating or mowing the lawn.
My murky childhood God who demanded belief was to be
replaced with an impartial, rational God who asked only
for justice. Some good came out of all this, not the least of
which was the mobilization of my whole class of seminarians in support of the Civil Rights Movement in many cases
against the opposition of their own churches!
On the other hand, even during high school I think I
realized that this model of reality was actually no more
objective than the one I had grown up with. There was so
much still that I could not make myself believe. It was full
of questions I must not ask if I did not want to be labeled
irrational, immature, or even immoral. It took the most
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fundamental, complex and subtle human realities and
declared them insignificant. How could I accept death as
the natural end of life in the case of a starving child, or a
mother dying of breast cancer, frantic for her small children? Even under the best of circumstances, I was unable
not to know that the reality of death was not clean, universal, simple.
One of the most paralyzingly painful things about this
ethos was the way all the claims of objective rationality
intertwined with explicit and implicitjudgments about
what it meant to be female. I began to learn this at the end
of the first day of my freshman History of Civilzation. The
affable and witty instructor had finished explaining that the
course was to be structured around a study of the economic
forces which had created the rise and fall of the world's
great empires. The insect sounds of early fall came peacefully through the open windows of the sunny room. Now,
he stood relaxed, waiting for questions, his pipe in his
mouth. A show-off student asked a question about Marx;
another asked about factors contributing to Napoleon's
down-fall. In spite of suffering from elementary school
fears of speaking in class, I raised my hand. My stomach
hurt. The instructor nodded in my direction.
I tried to articulate my question. "What I would like
to learn about is what everyday life was like for ordinary
people in each period. What did they think about? Will we
be studying that, too?"
The instructor, who was by this time sitting on top of
his desk, took his pipe out of his mouth, removed his left
ankle from his right knee, looked at me and laughed.
"Just like a woman!" he said. "No wonder women
can't think! Women are never interested in the Big
Picture; they are so subjective. All they are interested in is
feelings! If you want to learn about feelings, go read a
women's magazine!"
The class laughed. "Next?" he asked, putting his pipe
back in his mouth.
What became increasingly clear in college and seminary was that the whole scheme of rationality depended
upon a hierarchical division of the human race into the
"thinkers," and the "feelers." Men were the thinkers, the
powerful ones, the objective carriers of the higher powers
who thought about the big issues. Women were the feelers,
the carriers of emotion, the enemy of rationality, the ones
who lived in the realm of everyday, particular experience.
What happened in my first history course was repeated in
nearly every class in college I ever took. To the questions I
increasingly tried not to ask, I received a variant on the
same answer: "What kind of a question is that? Women
are so subjective!"
Women were not taken seriously because they couldn't
think. As for women who wanted to think, who could not
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help thinking, these women were contemptible. Women
were not supposed to want to think. It was the age of the
popularization of Freud. Women who thought were told
both in university classes and in popular women's magazines that it was the indisputable scientific conclusion of
modern psychology that women who thought were unnatural. Smart women made bad mothers. Smart women, like
women who were good at sports, threatened, even hurt
men.
An this raises two questions. What could I do once I
had begun to suspect that as a woman I would never be
more than tolerated in the university and seminary world
of rational thought? And even more fundamentally, why in
the world had I gone to seminary at all?
From childhood, I had read stories to comfort myself
over the messiness of the world. Stories from the Old
Testament had given me models of resourceful, independent children God approved of, like Joseph in Egypt, or
Ruth. Perhaps recalling my childhood pleasure in the stories from the Old Testament, I wanted to write a graduate
dissertation on the use of Old Testament imagery in the
English metaphysical poets. In preparation for this work, I
decided one morning to use the summer of 1963 before I
began graduate work to learn some Hebrew at the seminary on campus. With a little effort that same morning I
talked one of the Professors into monitoring me, and that
afternoon I bought a copy of Learning Hebrew By the
Inductive Method and a Hebrew Bible.
The next morning I studied the first pages of the
grammar, and I opened my new Bible. And then, stumbling in Hebrew through the opening line of Genesis 1:1,
"In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth,"
I had an Epiphany. Why this was so, I do not know, but I
still recall the way the shape of the letters and the look of
the light falling on the creamy paper were mixed up with
what I can only call a sense of cosmic goodness and joy in
all created things I had never encountered before. It was
as though the page itself was alive and the jots and tittles
on the letters little flames. For the first time I could recall,
life itself seemed all of a piece and trustworthy, and there
was a place for me in it. In that instant I knew that God
delighted in creation, in light, in water and mountains, in
fruit-bearing trees and grasses, in water creatures, and slithery things, in wild animals and tame, in men and most
important for me, in women like me.
I decided at that very moment to leave off graduate
work in English and to study Hebrew. Within the next few
weeks, I applied to seminary for this purpose, and I was
given a scholarship. I began second year Hebrew that fall.
I loved Hebrew. The next two years I took as many Old
Testament and Hebrew courses as I could for the purpose
of a graduate degree in Hebrew.
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At the same time, the relationship between my study
of Hebrew and my understanding and experience of God
was far from straightforward. Of course, I was not able to
stop believing in God as I had known God up till then
because what we know of God is always wrapped up in who
we are, in our ways of feeling, thinking and perceiving, as
we have been shaped by our personal experience, and by
our larger culture. In fact, it was as though I now knew and
believed simultaneously in three mutually contradictory
gods.
There was the Christian God I knew from the
Calvinistic Sunday Schools and Baptist revivals of my childhood who continued to grip my guilty imagination with
threats oflove, images ofjudgment, and demands of belief.
Then, there was the liberal God of the world of the
university and the seminary, the civilized, distant God of
Universal Reason, to whom any attempt to pray in personal
terms or for personal reasons was an act of intellectual dishonesty. God in this guise was the very embodiment of all
the supposedly male virtues academics including myself
admired: rationality, unemotionality, justice, and impartiality. Unfortunately, however, he was at the same time
the supreme rejection of "female" emotionality, particularity, partiality, spirituality. ("A fine paper," my seminary
teachers would say, "you think like a man.") Belief in this
God necessarily entailed the repudiation of myself as
female.
Finally, there was the almost secret, private God
whom I did not yet know but whom I had first encountered
on that summer day in the first pages of my Hebrew bible.
How was I to live with all this theological mutual contradictoriness? I handled the tension in the way I had been
trained in the university: I declared to myself that I was not
and would never be a Christian. I simply would choose,
rationally, to avoid Christianity. I would not take courses in
church history, or New Testament, or theology. Women
couldn't think, anyway. I would not grieve for any God I
could not please and I could not have. I would spend my
life studying Semitic languages, and for two years this is
what I did.
Then, I went off to Oxford in England to do graduate
work in Semitic studies. I thought I had entirely made my
escape. Oxford, with its women's colleges, took it for
granted that women could be scholars. The Oxford program in Hebrew suited me perfectly. We wrote Hebrew
compositions, both prose and poetry; we studied Semitic
philology; we read Hebrew texts; we read few secondary
sources and we did not ask questions about what the texts
we studied meant. ("Could we take just a few minutes to
talk about the meaning of the Book of Job?" I asked the
last week of a three term course on the Hebrew text ofJob.
Embarrassed, the students looked at the table top and shuf9

fled their feet. The small Scottish professor drew back.
"My dear madam, that is something to ask your tutor in the
privacy of your tutorial!") Leaving the pain of the present
far behind me, I retreated into the romantic dust of the
ancient world.
The first warning that things were not ultimately
going to work as I imagined came at the end of my first
term. I was sitting tensely in my tutor's office waiting for
what came next in his evaluation my first term's work. He
was a small, neat elderly English Baptist, and he was sitting
in meditative silence.
"Well, my dear," he said at last, steepling his tidy fmgers, and looking at me with his bright eyes, "If you are('
going to take your examinations in two years, you will need"---.
to start your second Semitic language now. Syriac will be
just the thing."
"Syriac?" I said, stupidly.
"Yes," he replied. "You will enjoy it. A wonderfullanguage, and all the surviving texts are from the early
church!"
I gave him twenty reasons, none of them the real
ones, why Syriac with its Christian texts was impossible. In
the end, I lost.
I lost badly. Two years later, I found that I was actually going to have to do a dissertation in the area of patristic
theology. The beginning of the search for a topic was truly
awful. I spent one anxious week after another in the
Bodleian library reading in Greek and Syriac texts which
soon all ran together in my mind into one. Even apart
from the gloom with which these Christian works filled me,
I could not get the hang of any of it. They proved the truth
of Christianity by pointing to Jesus' miracles; at the same
time, they declared that the image of God in human beings
resided in human rationality. In their talk about God the
Logos, they seemed to combine in a particularly incomprehensible manner the painfully oppressive language,
imagery and demands of both of the Christian gods I had

tried to escape.
The beginning of my way out of this morass came
about six months into my general reading for a dissertation
topic. I had learned that the christological controversies of
the fifth century were regarded as central to patristic
thought, and that many of these texts were in Syriac. I had
begun, therefore, to focus my attention on the writings of
the monophysites, one of the major parties in the christological debates. One autumn morning as I sat in the
Bodleian library surrounded by tall piles of nineteenth cen/
tury volumes of these monophysite authors, I picked up
and opened to the middle of one of these books, The

Thirteen Ascetical Homilies of Philoxenus ofMabbug.
The homily I opened to that morning was not, however, a christological text. Rather, it was a sermon on the
Christian life written in the tradition of the great early
fourrtfers of Egyptian and Syrian monasticism. It was an
exhortation to those early monks not to criticize or judge
each other, but rather, to treat each other with the gentleness of God, who especially loves the ones the world despises, and who is always so much more willing than human
beings to make allowances for sin, because it is God alone
who sees the whole of who we are and who we have been,
who understands the depths of our temptations and the
extent of our sufferings.
In the reading of those words I was given a second
epiphany. I felt my eyes fill with tears of astonishment,
gratitude, and hope. Knowing as I did nothing of early
monasticism, within five minutes Philoxenus of Maggub
had conveyed to me not only the early monastic vision of
God, he carried to my alienated and fearful heart the very
God of whom he spoke. I had come once again face to
face with the elusive God I had met five years earlier in the
Hebrew text of Genesis, and for the first time this God was
wearing an unmistakably Christian face.
I left the library that morning resolved to do my
research on Philoxenus'
monastic theology .
Unfortunately, this was not to be. Philoxenus was not, after

I was a new teacher, ambitious and confident in my powers to dispel darkness of mind, to make students
better human beings. Surely my older colleague was a burnt -out case when he said, "Let's face it. We
can't teach students; they can only learn." Now I must sound similarly a cinder to my young associates. It's
nothing so simple as "They must have the motivation" versus "The teacher must motivate." My situation
today is a more complicated confusion of who shall be taught, what shall they learn, when shall learning
take the lead over teaching. What I knew thirty years ago to be merely a process-requiring for success
vituoso performance-turns out now to be nothing less than the mystery of human relations-individual,
social, corporate, creative, physical, spiritual, cultural, transcendent.....
Truffaut's film gives no answers, but it does comfort me to recognize that the pedagogue's dilemma is
perennial. I see myself not only in the figure of M. ltard, the teacher, but also in the person of the child.

W. F. Eifrig
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all, noted in the ancient world for his ascetical theology,
but for his christology. Even more significantly, however,
in the Protestant world of theological scholarship, there
was a conviction that the real contribution of the patristic
church was made in "the hammering out of doctrine" that
took place in the early controversies and Ecumenical
Councils. The early monastic movement was understood
to be no more than a backwater of the early church, comprised largely of irrational, body-hating, world-denying crazies who were interested only in the "spiritual life." Serious
scholars studied the development of doctrine.
The clean intellectual issues of the christological controversies at this point seemed to me not so much cle;1n as
they were sterile alongside the monastic material, but christology was what I was supposed to be doing, and so I did it.
At first, everything was straightforward. The christological
texts were, in fact, incredibly complex, and in spite of my
doubts about whether I had enough theological ability to
understand them, I enjoyed getting inside the thought patterns of its ancient combatants to make sense of the logic
of their theological puzzles. To that end I continued to
read widely in the eastern patristic writers.
Slowly, slowly the fourth, fifth and sixth centuries
began to come into focus. Slowly, slowly I began to learn
that the God of the monks was the God of the christological texts. Something was happening to me as my heart
began to make connections the university was breaking.

I

am not sure at what point I realized I was in a crisis.
I only know that one day I woke up with a severe anxiety
attack that lasted for weeks. Day after day when I sat down
to work, I was paralyzed. I could not read, I could not
write, and I could not think. I did not know what was the
matter with me. Only gradually it dawned on me. Without
even being aware of it, I had committed myself to the God I
was encountering in the texts. The problem, now, was that
I had also been completely drawn into the logic of patristic
christology. I was afraid of my mind that had gotten me in
so much trouble in the past. I was terrified that I would
find at the end of my research that all the ancient christology I was studying was basically implausible, and so I would
have to abandon the God to whom I had already committed myself as implausible as well.
In my paralysis, I did not know what to do. Then, one
day, when I was at my worst, I brought myself to talk with
the chaplain at Pusey House, whom I knew slightly. He
gave no advice, but seeing that I was suffering from exhaustion, he offered to arrange a three-day rest for me in the
guest house of the Anglican Benedictine convent off the
Iilley Road in south Oxford. In spite of my rationalistic
and low-church Protestant prejudices, I accepted.
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I was in bad shape when I got off the bus at the
Fairacres stop two days later. I only vaguely remember
being welcomed at the front gate and led to the guest
house by a smiling, stout, middle aged oblate, dressed in a
habit. Dimly, I recall her explanation of the rules of the
house and the delicious, comforting smell of food cooking.
And I almost remember slowly climbing the stairs to my little room on the second floor, where I shut the door, lay
down, and fell into an immediate sleep on top of the bed,
still dressed in my coat and hat and mittens.
\Vhat happened some time later, however, is sharp in
my mind. I was awakened by a knock on my door.
Confused and still in my outdoor clothes, I stood up, and
nearly before I could say "come in," Mother Jane was in the
room. Immediately, her presence overwhelmed me. She
was a tall, striking woman in her graceful habit, and she
had a welcoming face with rosy cheeks and very clear eyes,
but what was overwhelming wasn't any of that. Before she
said a word I noticed that there was something odd about
the way she walked, and the way she held herself. There
was a freedom in her that I had never seen in any woman,
or any living human being, for that matter, a freedom that
I had not even imagined to be possible. This was a woman,
a woman radiating intelligence, energy, and kindness, absolutely without fear, completely at home in the world and
fully, unapologetically herself.
\Vhile I stood there, dumbly, she walked toward me.
Then, she bent toward me to give me a kiss. The kiss was
too much for me. I threw my arms around her neck, sobbing. She patted me soothingly for a few minutes, then
asked me gently what was wrong. Somehow, within a few
minutes I gulped out honestly not only all my anxiety about
my research, but the fear, and humiliation, and hurt I had
felt as a woman around the use of my mind my whole life.
I don't recall the exact words of her reply. They were
something like "it is God who gave you your mind; never be
afraid to use any of God's gifts to its fullest." Because like
the God of the early monastic writers she had seen me
clearly in all my particular pain and guilt, and she had
looked on me with love, she was able to free me from my
fear. At the same time, because she was a woman who herself so clearly embodied what she said, she showed me that
a human being, and a woman, could live in this freedom
from fear, full of integrity and joy, her thought, her feelings and her prayer not divided.
In the days that followed, I slept and ate, thought and
prayed in a state of peace that I had never known before.
As an enclosed order of contemplatives, the sisters had no
contact with visitors. In the chapel, however, during the
offices of prayer which I was allowed to attend, I watched
the sisters attentively as they prayed. I saw them look out
the window, listen to the birds, fidget, concentrate or day-
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dream and I knew that for them prayer was neither the
pious, private emotional activity that was, as I had been
taught, the superstitious opposite of thought, nor was it the
rationalistic exercise I had known in seminary. The sisters
obviously lived in an intellectual world more real, messier
and less truncated than the one I was trying to live in, and
they had the same fearless freedom I had met in Mother
Jane.

In Mother Jane and the sisters at the convent I met
the same integration of the heart and the mind that I had
encountered in the great eastern teachers of the early
church. For Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, and Philoxenus
of Maggub, as well as for the teachers of Egyptian desert
monasticism, there can be no real split between the spiritual and the intellectual. The reason that this is so lies, ironically, in their insistence, first, that human beings are made
in the image of God, and second, that the heart of that
image is rationality.
As for the exercise of rationality, for the patristic writers, to be rational means to see the world as it really is, that
is, to look on the world and especially the people in it, with
the clear eyes of God. But how does God see the world as it
really is? Not according to the ancient church by looking
at it either with the judgmental eyes of a God who sets the
rules, or with the unemotional, impartial, analytical gaze of
the hard scientist seeking abstract universal truth . God
looks at the world through the eyes of love. If we, therefore, as human beings made in the image of God also want
to see reality rationally, that is, as it truly is, then we, too,
must learn to look at what we see with love. For the teachers of the early church, rational thought-especially about
God or about other people-is only rational when it is also
loving.
As for the characteristics of this love, God's rational
love is not an abstract, impartial love that looks on all
things and all people with the same calm and benign gaze.
Of course God's love is universal in that it extends without
fail to every single thing, be it plant, or person, or plateau
God made. This had been part of my discovery of God in
the Hebrew text of Genesis.
The beginning of my turning point to Christianity,
however, came the day I heard from Philoxenus that only
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God can judge us because it is God alone, who, looking
with compassion on the depth and variety of our individual
experience and our suffering, really knows us as we are.
For the early monastics, the particular, the realm of difference and of experience is not the enemy of rationality.
The very trustworthiness of God's rationality depends upon
the focused particularity of God's love of the individual.
But this implies that, because we are made in God's image,
the trustworthiness of our knowledge of others, and the
world as well depends upon our ability to see and love the
messiness of the particular as well.
History matters to Christians precisely because our
religion is a religion of the particular. This, in fact, is what
the incarnation is about. God came in flesh and blood
among us as a particular human being. Jesus was born in
first century Palestine into a particular home, and he died
a specific and individual death. In between, he taught and
healed real, individual men and women, and he made very
specific, non-universal friends and disciples like Mary and
Martha, Peter and John. By all this particularity it seems to
me that God has demonstrated to us that individual, messy
human lives are not only of value to God: it is by looking at
the particularity of human lives that we become able to see
reality. This, in fact, is why I have used this autobiographical form to reflect on the meaning and characteristics of
Christian rationality as it relates to spirituality.
My own educational experience is not unique.
Many women and men in this room share my experience.
I also know that a number of the destructive assumptions of
the ethos of rationality that undergirded my original education are still alive. A major purpose of higher education is
to teach people to think. But human beings cannot really
think if they are not allowed to be who they are or take
account of what they know, even if it is frightening or
inconvenient. The heart of the child worried that the
world would run out of coal was at last comforted and
strengthened by a woman who said and demonstrated in
her own person, "God gave you your mind; do not be
afraid to use it." In the last analysis for the Christian there
can be no split between the intellectual and the spiritual.
The way of God, and the way of knowing are one. 0
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THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT:
SPIRITUALITY AS AN ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE

Bernard McGinn

The late Justice Potter Stewart was the source of the
noted remark, "I don't know how to define obscenity, but I
sure know it when I see it." Much the same can be said for
spirituality. Obscenity, despite endless debates and not a
few court decisions, still lies mostly in the eye of the
beholder. Spirituality, which cannot profit from legal
decisions about community standards for its possible
identity, usually has to rely on the fickleness of academics
to try to speak its name, though this fact has never
prevented people from just doing it and not bothering
about defining it. Academics, unfortunately, do need to be
attentive to issues of description and definition.
Both spirituality and obscenity are also linked by a
common semantic explosion-everybody seems to be
talking about them, though often at cross-purposes. The
debate over obscenity, of course, gets into the news more
frequently, but the documentation on the prolific growth
of the term "spirituality" in recent American culture is
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substantial, and it involves not only those interested in
religion. I await the moment (perhaps not far off), when a
product will be advertised on national television because of
the contribution it makes to some form of spirituality.
In 1961 the Italian medievalist Gustavo Vinay referred
to spirituality as "a necessary pseudoconcept we don't know
how to replace" ( 706). It is certainly the kind of
pseudoconcept which seems to have a life of its own,
whether academics oppose it or attempt to profit from its
ubiquity. Given the relative novelty of "spirituality" to
many, as well as the ambiguity that allows it to be used so
variously (often in contradictory fashion) a case could
certainly be made that the term should be dropped from
the contemporary study of religion. But I am convinced
that despite the ambiguities of the word, there are
important issues at stake in spirituality's recent popularity,
as well as considerable contributions that the study of
spirituality can bring to religion in the decades ahead.
Trying to present this case is not easy, because it requires a
survey of the history of the term followed by reflections on
definition and methodology in religious studies-issues
that make all but the most academic eyes glaze over.
Spirituality is not a new word in English. As used in
the fifteenth century, it generally meant either an episcopal
gathering (i.e., a spirituality of bishops, the equivalent of a
pride of lions), or ecclesiastical possessions or revenues.
These are not the meanings most of us have in mind when
we talk of spirituality today, however much we hope
bishops may be spiritual men. But as early as the
fourteenth century "spirituality, (or spiritualty)" was to be
found in the more ancient sense of the quality or condition
of being spiritual, as can be seen in Piers Plowman (Passus 5
13

of the B text) where Wrath relates how he delights in
setting friars against parish priests:
I, Wrath, walke with hem and wisse hem of my hokes,
Thus they speken of spiritualte, that either despitheth
oother
Til they be bothe beggars and by my spiritualte libben,
Or ellis a! riche and ridden aboute (lines 14648).
It is noteworthey that Langland's view of spirituality is
already particularized into special forms, and is also
capable of being twisted to the devil's purpose by Wrath.
The problems of spirituality and its perversions seem to go
back to its earliest English appearances.
Where then did the term originate and what is its
history? The role of the spirit ( ruah) of God in the Old
Testament was the foundation for the New Testament
emphasis on the importance of the "spirit" (pneuma) and
the qualifier "spiritual" (pneumatikos) in the foundational
Christian documents. In Luke-Acts the Spirit is in Jesus in
the act of establishing the community (e.g., Lk. 4:14, Ac.
2:32-33). Paul identifies the Risen Lord with the pneuma
(e.g., 2 Cor. 3:17, 1 Cor. 6:17), and John emphasizes the
rebirth in the Spirit and in truth (e.g., Jn. 3:3-8, 4:23, and
the Last Discourses). As is well known, the Christian
opposition between "flesh" (sarx) and "spirit" originally
had nothing to do with a dualistic anthropology
contrasting body and soul, but rather addressed the
concrete human choices between life lived according to
egoistic satisfaction and that conducted according to God's
purpose. Despite popular accounts to the contrary, few
patristic and medieval theologians missed this point,
though they often had difficulties harmonizing it with the
dualistic Platonic anthropology they adopted from
Hellenistic sources. (For more information regarding the
term's history, see Leclercq; Alexander; or Principe. For
New Testament study, see Schweizer.)
Spiritualis, the Latin translation of pneumatikos,
appears 22 times in the Vulgate of St. Jerome, but it was not
until the fifth century that we find the noun spiritualitas,
appearing in a letter anciently ascribed to St. Jerome: "Age
ut in spiritualitate proficias," that is, "Act in order to grow
in spirituality." (This fifth-century text, found in PL
30:115A, has been doubtfully ascribed to both Pelagius and
to Faustus ofRiez.) It is clear that in this text, the term still
bears the meaning that pneumatikos had from the origins of
Christianity-increase your hold on the Spirit of Jesus, the
source of the Christian life. This is the way in which the
substantive was used in its rare appearances in the early
Middle Ages. (See Leclercq 281-84) In the twelfth
century, however, spiritualitas was employed more
frequently and more diversely. Not only was it used in the
traditional sense of the power animating Christian life, but

14

it began to be used by Scholastic theologians, Gilbert of
Poitiers for example, in a naturalistic and philosophical
way, as what pertains to the soul as contrasted with the
body. The perhaps unavoidable mingling of these two
meanings in later Christian history has been one of the less
happy consequences of Scholasticism-the root of those
conceptions of spirituality which willy-nilly used it as the
reason for giving the physical world and especially the
human body a largely negative role in what they conceived
of as authentic Christian life. Thomas Aquinas forms an
interesting example of a bridge figure. According to the
Index Thomisticus, the term appears about seventy times,
and Thomas seems usually to think of spiritualitas in the
traditional sense of integral Christian perfection, as when
he says that "Sanctificatio gratiae pertinet ad
spiritualitatem," or "Sanctification by grace belongs to
spirituality." But he is not above using the newer
philosophical mode in which spirituality means what
belongs to the soul as soul. It was also in the thirteenth
century that spiritualitas found a juridical use, being
applied to ecclesiastical offices and goods.
The later Middle Ages was the era of the great
migration of Latin terminology into the vernaculars of
Europe whose descendents we still use in our theological
constructions. According to Lucy Tinsely's study, the first
emigre of spiritualitas appears in the Old French espiritualite
of the mid-thirteenth century, though this word was most
often employed in the jurisdictional sense. The fourteenth
and fifteenth-century Middle English examples cited above
are indicative of the spread of the term throughout the late
medieval vernaculars. At the beginning of the sixteenth
century, in Johannes Altenstaig's Vocabulary of Theology, the
Latin adjective spirituale still kept its biblical meaning as
referring to the whole person's way of acting (Raitt, 45456), but during the course of the sixteenth and seventeeth
centuries there seems to have been a gradual shift of
"spirituality," both in Latin and in the vernaculars, toward
signifYing only the inner dispositions, the interior states of
the soul. This is the way we find it used in John of the
Cross, for example, in the words "And if, now that the
spirit has achieved spirituality [ espiritualidat!J in this way..."
In seventeeth century France "spirituality" was widely used
in the sense of "Everything connected with the interior
exercises of the soul free of the senses which seeks only to
be perfected in the eyes of God," as one dictionary puts it
(Leclercq 293-94). But the crisis of mysticism caused by
the condemnation of Quietism at the end of the
seventeenth century had its effect on the popularity of
"spirituality," as we can see in Voltaire's ironic references to
"la nouvelle spiritualite" of Madame Guyon and Francois
Fenelon (Principe 132). In the eighteenth and nineteenth
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centuries the terms "devotion" and "piety" became far
more popular among both Catholics and Protestants. Jon
Alexander, for example, points out that "spirituality" was
used in the nineteenth century mostly by free religious
groups, the same groups who kept alive interest in such
suspect figures as Madame Guyon (248). On the academic
side, the dogmatic categories of ascetical and mystical
theology favored by the Italian Jesuit Giovanni Battista
Scaramelli (1687-1752) won the day. Up to the middle of
the present century, among Roman Catholics at least,
ascetical and mystical theology was still the preferred term
for what is now almost universally referred to as either
spiritual theology or spirituality.
The reasons for the revival of the term "spirituality" in
France around the beginning of this century remain
something of a mystery. Auguste Saudreau, who was using
the term in 1900, issued his Manuel de spiritualiti in 1916,
and Pierre Pourrat's very successful four-volume La
spiritualiti catholique was published between 1918 and 1928.
The Jesuit Joseph de Guibert also began employing the
term extensively, and in 1932 the first fascicule of the great
Dictionnaire de spiritualiti appeared. By 1943 when Etienne
Gilson gave the inaugural lecture for the establishment of
the chair of the history of spirituality at the Institut
Catholique in Paris, spirituality had definitely arrived.
Spirituality became popular more gradually in
English, being first introduced among Catholics in
dependence on the French, and, according to Principe,
appears first in 20th century English in the 1922 translation
of Pourrat (134). Alexander's survey of the Catholic
Periodical Index turned up only 11 uses in titles of articles
between 1930 and 1964 and no less than 146 uses between
1965 and 1976 ( 149). By the 1970s the all-powerful
gravitational pull of spirituality was as evident in America as
it was in France. One sign was the capitulation of the
journals. The French Jesuit periodical which had started
out "Scaramellianly" as the Revue d'ascetique et de mystique in
1920 changed its name to the Revue d 'histoire de La spiritualiti
in 1972, and in 1977 the American journal Cross and Crown
became Spirituality Today.
God alone probably knows how many appearances of
"spirituality" can be found in journal articles of the past
fifteen years. On the American scene, these same fifteen
years have witnessed the publication of the Classics of
Western Spirituality series (seventy-seven volumes since
1978), and the commencement of World Spirituality: An
Encyclopedic History of the Religious Quest, of which eleven
volumes have appeared since 1985. A number of singlevolume dictionaries of spirituality have also become
available, as well as countless books, academic and popular,
with "spirituality" in the title. It is now possible to take a
Ph.D. degree in spirituality in at least four American
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univers11les (Fordham, Catholic University, Duquesne and
the Berkeley GTU). Perhaps most surprising has been the
willingness not only of non-Catholic Christians but even
non-Christians to embrace the term spirituality, as has been
demonstrated by the World Spirituality project (though, to
be sure, this was not without its conflicts and difficulties).
One may think of the growth of the term "spirituality" in
the past generation as either a good or a bad thing, but it is
certainly a major new factor on the map of American
religion.
In the second and longer part of this paper, I wish to
consider the role of spirituality, whatever it may be,
primarily in terms of religious academia, that is, the
teaching of religion in all its aspects. I will do so under
three headings. First, what is spirituality and how are we to
relate it to other disciplines that concern the study of
religion? Second, should it be taught? And third, how
should it be taught?
Without by any means making an exhaustive search, I
recently turned up some thirty-five different definitions of
spirituality, both "first-order" definitions, that is, ones
concerned with the phenomenon itself, and "secondorder" definitions treating of the study of spirituality.
Most of the second-order definitions are of the theological
variety. (Second-order definitions of an anthropological
and historical-contextual type usually add nothing to the
first-order definition except the qualification of "the study
of." It would be, of course, possible to add qualifications
about the perspective used in such study, though in the
case of defining mysticism this appears to have been rarely
done, at least in the sense of entering into the definition
itself. Walter Principe, on pp. 135-36, makes an interesting
distinction between three levels of spirituality: (a) the real
or existential level; (b) the level of a formulation of a
teaching about the lived reality, as in Ignatian spirituality;
and (c) the study by scholars of the first and especially the
second levels.)
At first glance, this might seem to indicate total
semantic chaos, but things are not quite that dismal. These
descriptions and definitions tend to fall into broad groups
exhibiting common features, however much they differ in
details. At this stage in the evolution of the discipline (if
such it be), semantic confusion and vigorous debate is
probably not a bad thing, especially insofar as it tends to
clarity the current state of the question. I also think that it
is possible for scholars to disagree about what is primary in
the notion of spirituality and still work together in
productive fashion because they are convinced that there is
something primary about spirituality itself, however
conceived.
Sandra Schneiders in her important 1989 article

15

"Spirituality in the Academy" suggests two kinds of
approaches to spirituality-"a dogmatic position supplying
a 'definition from above' and an anthropological position
supplying a 'definition from below" (Schneiders, 682). I
think that the picture is actually more complicated than
that, because there is a third option, an historicalcontextual one. I would like to suggest that rather than the
model of above-and-below (which is not a very nuanced
view of how much contemporary theology deals with the
problem of relating God and world), it would be better to
think of recent views of spirituality as trying to relate
various theological, anthropological and historicalcontextual ways of conceiving the connection between
limited and unlimited value systems. It is also important to
note that a number of investigators provide both general
definitions of spirituality, as well as scientific definitions of
Christian spirituality, a process that often enables them to
combine two or all three approaches.
Be not afraid. I do not intend to discuss thirty-five
different definitions of spirituality, anymore than I would
as many legal definitions of obscenity. But I do need to
provide some key examples of important definitions and to
reflect on what camps they fall into in order to frame my
own understanding of the state of the field. I apologize for
the way in which often subtle and extensive presentations
will be summarized here-few of the authors cited will
probably be happy with my brief characterizations of their
position in the paragraphs that follow.
Older examples of definitions of spirituality, largely
Catholic in provenance, were often second-order
definitions emphasizing the theological character of the
discipline to the exclusion, at least by implication, of
anthropology, history and the human sciences as having
any constitutive role. Pierre Pourret was more resolute
than most of his followers when he affirmed early in this
century that "Spirituality is that part of theology which
deals with Christian perfection and the ways that lead to it,"
but this view has not been absent from recent Catholic
thought either. For example, one can cite C. A. Bernard,
who sees spirituality as "a theological discipline studying
Christian existence by describing its progressive
development and elucidating its structures and laws" (37),
as well as Eugene Megyer. Those who take this approach
often prefer the term "spiritual theology" to spirituality
itself, James A. Wiseman, for example, who describes
spiritual theology in Lonerganian terms (143-59). NonCatholic scholars, such as Bradley C. Hanson, take a
similar line, arguing that spiritual theology involves not
only "a rigor of reflection" but also "a strongly existential
relation to the subject matter" ( 49). The Anglican writer
Kenneth Leech is another example of someone who
understands spirituality primarily as spiritual theology.
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Leech's preface to Experiencing God: theology as spirituality
describes his book as "An exploration in spiritual theology,
that is, in the search for a transforming knowledge of God."
However, many recent discussions of spirituality, even
by Catholics, have hesitated over the term "spiritual
theology," perhaps because of their fear that this may
involve the reduction of spirituality to a mere appendage of
dogmatic or moral theology. For example, more than
thirty years ago, Louis Bouyer, although he spoke of
spirituality as based on dogmatic theology, insisted that
"Christian spirituality (or any other spirituality) is
distinguished from dogma by the fact that, instead of
studying or describing the objects of belief as it were in the
abstract, it studies the reactions which these objects arouse
in the religious consciousness." Thus he saw the discipline,
which he, however, also spoke of as "spiritual theology," as
being intimately connected to both human psychology and
history (viii-ix). I find something of the same in Josef
Sudbrack's article on "Spirituality" in Sacramentum Mundi,
though he avoids any definition. The problem is this: Is
spirituality a theological discipline or a separate field of
the study of religion? And, if it is a theological discipline
or specialization, how does it relate to the other aspects of
the study of theology, whether conceived in traditional or
in non-traditional ways?
A significant option, argued by some of the most
weighty twentieth-century Catholic theological voices, is
built upon a distinction between a generic notion of
spirituality based upon human hunger for transcendence
and specifically Christan spirituality which is to be
measured by the norm of revelation (which does not
necessarily have to mean that Christian spirituality is just a
specialization of dogmatics). Perhaps the most interesting
spokesman of this view has been the Swiss theologian Hans
Urs von Balthasar, who, in three typically dense and
powerful papers distinguished between spirituality as a
"basic practical or existential attitude which is the
expression of how one understands ethically committed
existence," and the properly Christian spirituality which is
nothing other than "the subjective aspect of dogmatic
theology." (For the former notion, see "The Gospel as
Norm ... " in Spirituality, 7; for the latter quotation,
"Spirituality" in Explorations, 211. In "Spirituality," 212,
von Balthasar defines theologia spiritualis as "the Church's
objective teaching on how revelation is to be realized in
practice.") Another example can be found in the
Dominican Jordan Aumann who says that "... spirituality
refers to any religious or ethical value that is concretized as
an attitude or spirit from which one's actions flow." For
Aumann, spirituality is not restricted to any particular
religion; it pertains to the field of religious psychology. It
becomes the basis for spiritual theology when the spirit in
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question is understood as the Holy Spirit, so that properly
Christian spirituality is "a participation in the mystery of
Christ through the interior life of grace" ( 17 and 18).
Principe also appears to follow this line , explicitly
appealing to von Balthasar, but creating his own definitions
of general spirituality and specifically Christian spirituality.
General spirituality is "the way in which a person
understands and lives within his or her historical context
that aspect of his or her religion, philosophy or ethic that is
viewed as the loftiest, the noblest, the most calculated to
lead to the fullness of the ideal or perfection being sought"
(136). Note the important anthropological and historical
elements here. The definition of Christian spirituality is
"life in the Spirit as brothers and sisters of jesus Christ and
daughters and sons of the Father" (135). Finally, although
Karl Rahner was not at pains to give a definition of
spirituality, on the basis of his distinction between
transcendental experience and supernatural experience
(and how he applied this to mysticism), one can think that
a position along these lines would not be foreign to him
(See McGinn 286-89).
Despite these nuanced theological options, the
majority of definitions today can be described as variants of
"anthropological" understandings (taken in both a
philosophical and social scientific sense), that is, ones that
put the greatest stress on spirituality as an element in
human nature and experience. Many scholars see
spirituality primarily as a "depth-dimension" of human
existence. These definitions involve, implicitly or
explicitly, a notion of human authenticity, and often also of
transcendence, or at least of self-transcendence. Let me
cite some examples to give you the flavor. Spirituality
involves "the inner dimension of the person ... [where]
ultimate reality is experienced" (Ewart Cousins, xiii) or it
concerns "the constituent of human nature which seeks
relations with the ground or purpose of existence" (G.
Wakefield, v), or it is seen as "a capacity for selftranscendence" Qoann Wolski Conn, 3) . Shifting from
attempts to characterize the inner ground itself to
characterizations of our experience of it, we find an even
larger number of definitions/descriptions. Spirituality has
to do "with becoming a person in the fullest sense" Qohn
Macquarrie 40 and 47), or is "one typical way of handling
the human condition" (Raymundo Panikkar, 9). For J.C.
Breton, it is a way of engaging anthropological questions in
order to arrive at a richer and more authentically human
life, something which does not seem much different from
Jon Alexander's view that it concerns those aspects of
human life which are seen by their subjects as intentionally
related to what holds unrestricte d value (Breton, 97-105).
Sa ndra Schneiders praises the basic line taken by Breton,
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but tries to be more precise by defining spirituality as "the
experience of consciously striving to integrate one's life in
terms not of isolation and self-absorption but of selftranscendence toward the ultimate value one perceives"
("Theology and Spirituality 684). This position leaves
open the possibility for forms of non-religious, or secular
spirituality, as does Edward Kinerk who thinks of
spirituality as the expression of a dialectical personal
growth from the inauthentic to the authentic (Edward
Kinerk 6). Michael Downey, on the other hand, would
seem to exclude this because, in his preface, he sees
spirituality as concerned with the relational and personal
dimensions of the human person's relation to the divine.
Perhaps the vaguest expression of the anthropological
approach known to me occurs in an article of Rachel
Hosmer, who begins her piece with the observation:
"Spirituality in the broadest sense defies definition. It
refers to whatever in human experience is alive and
Intentional, conscious of itself and responsive to others"
(425). However, like the theological positions cited above,
Hosmer goes on to talk about specifically Christian
spirituality, which she describes as "focused in Christ and
his Body the Church as the community of believers and the
locus of the encounter between the human and the divine."
The advantages of the anthropological approach are
many, as Sandra Schneiders among others, has pointed out
("Spirituality in the Academy" 683). First, this option
seems to be that adopted by the majority of recent
investigators (though the argument from numbers should
not be decisive). Second, this approach allows for
ecumenical Christian and wider interreligious use of the
term, and even, in most cases, for the possibility of a
secular spirituality (which many today argue is an
important option.) A third advantage, at least from the
academic point of view, is that it encourages the study of
spirituality from the viewpoint of the human sciences and
thus gives it entry into academia on as broad a base as
possible. The disadvantages, however, are equally evident.
Many of the definitions or descriptions cited above are so
vague that they make any definition of spirituality as a field
of study impossible-if spirituality is everything that is good
and positive about what is human then all it needs is a
round of applause rather than cultivation and study. Even
those definitions, like that of Sandra Schneiders, which
clarify more precisely exactly what aspect of human
behavior is the subject matter of spirituality, as well as the
perspective from which it is to be studied, run into the
difficulty of distinguishing that subject matter and
perspective from what it is that religion is supposed to
study, or from the object of ethics broadly conceived (Cf.
Hanson 48-49). In trying to determine what spirituality is
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by taking anthropological route alone, it may well be that
all we have come up with is another name for religion.
More careful distinctions between religion, ethics and
spirituality are certainly in order at the present time-their
creation would seem to be important to the academic
future of the discipline.
There is a third approach to defining spirituality, one
less often found in a pure form perhaps, but still worthy of
note. I refer to this as the historical-contextual approach
because it emphasizes spirituality as an experience rooted
in a particular community's history rather than as a
dimension of human existence as such (not that it excludes
this). I myself had something like this view in mind in the
"Introduction" to Christian Spirituality I, when I spoke of
Christian spirituality as "the lived experience of Christian
belief in both its general and more specialized forms," and
later termed it "the effort to appropriate Christ's saving
work in our lives" (xv; cf. 254). This quasi-definition has
been criticized with some justice, in particular by Carlos M.
N. Eire, for being vague and difficult to distinguish from
moral theology, though I did try to make such a
distinction by restricting spirituality to "those acts in which
the relation to God is immediate and explicit" (ibid., xvi).
However, I have no interest in unyielding defense of this
particular formulation in a paper whose point is that there
is no fully adequate definition.
Several other recent students of spirituality have
emphasized the contextual element in helpful ways. In his
Christian Spirituality, Rowan Williams says, "And if
spirituality can be given any coherent meaning, perhaps it
is to be understood in terms of this task: each believer
making his or her own that engagement with the

questioning at the heart of faith which is so evident in the
classical documents of Christian belief" (1). Urban T.
Holmes also adopted a historical-contextual approach,
defining his task as answering the question "How has
Christian humanity throughout its history understood what
it is to seek God and to know him?" (3). A good example
of a description of spirituality that emphasizes the
historical dimension while being able to include the other
two elements can be found in the French historian Andre
Vauchez who speaks of spirituality as "the dynamic unity of
the content of faith and the way in which it is viewed by
historically determined human beings" (7). Recently,
Philip Sheldrake's Spirituality and History has also
emphasized the importance of history in the study of
spirituality.
The emphasis on the historical rootedness of
spirituality in a particular community, of course, would
seem to cast doubt on the possibility of a secular
spirituality, unless we think of certain secular traditions
(e.g., Marxism) as taking on the aspects of a quasi-religious
community. It is also clear that a historical-contextual
approach alone, since it rests primarily on the witness of
adherents who say they have a spirituality, cannot, of itself,
address normative questions. (In the discussion of the oral
version of this paper, the interesting question of the
possibility of a "Satanic spirituality," or a "Nazi spirituality"
was raised. I would argue against seeing these as authentic
spiritualities, but it would be difficult to do so on a
historical-contextual approach alone, since significant
communities would assert that these represented their
"authentic," and even "transcendent" values). Therefore,
the historical-contextual approach, of its very nature, has
the advantage of implying the other two, that is, it must

We teachers usually expect our students to be changed in some (often, we hope, fundamental)
way by our teaching. Under Itard's influence the undomesticated boy is changed-socialized. In the
same way that he learns to wear clothing, he learns that objects have names, that pleasing people has
rewards, that even caring people may be unjust.
Strikingly, the highly socialized ltard is as much changed in the process of teaching as the boy,
Victor, is transformed. The teacher moves from eager, detached intellectual curiosity to more
sympathetic-even empathic-involvement with his pupil. He discovers the nature of the boy as he
goes, and adjusts his pedagogy as best he can to meet what he perceives to be the needs of the
learner. At some point he begins to see his pupil as a human being, not as an animal. Not quite an
equal, but more than just a creature to be tamed.
It is significant that Truffaut, the director, takes the role of the teacher in this film. The film thus
raises other questions. Does Truffaut's film theory-that a film's director may be its single dominant
creator or auteur, surpassing writers, actors, and cinematographers in control of a film's style, form,
theme, and content-apply to teaching? To what extent is the teacher an auteur in the learning
process? Does art seek principally to educate or to change? Is the viewer changed by the film?
Margaret Franson
18
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have a relation to the beliefs of the community, the
theology that formalizes these, and eventually, if not in
every instance, to the truth claims of those beliefs. And it
also must take into account what the study of the practice
of be liefs within historical human communities has to say
about human nature as such, that is, it must be ope n to
anthropology, conceived of from both philosophical and
social-scientific perspectives. The mutual implication of all
three approaches to understanding the meaning of
spirituality hinted at here provides, I believe, an important
insight into the current situation regarding the status of
the term.
What may seem like helpless confusion, or open
warfare between different approaches, may, if we turn it on
its head, actually be an advantage. I do not believe that we
have any really adequate definition of spirituality at the
present time-and we may never have Uust as we will
probably never have a fully adequate definition of
religion). Theologically speaking at least, Hans Urs von
Balthasar provides us with a reason for this when he
reminds us: "No mission, no spirituality, is capable of
being defined in its living center. They all come from the
infinite variety of the divine life, which always exceeds the
compass of the human mind" ("Spirituality" 226). If it is
indeed the case that spirituality is one of those terms where
exploration will never yield clear and universally acceptable
definition, then it is primarily in the ongoing discussion
among the three approaches outlined above that we will, if
only in some asymptotic fashion, approach a more
adequate understanding of what spirituality is in itself, as
well as possibly work out better ways to study it. What I
would insist upon at the present is that all three options
remain in conversation, though this conversation will
doubtless take different forms depending on the context,
that is, whether it takes place as a part of the humanistic
study of religion or in specifically religious educational
institutions.
This brings me to the second question, this is, should
spirituality be taught? There are those who think that
spirituality cannot be taught, at least in the way in which
other subjects can be. To these we may respond that it has
always been taught. As Ewart Cousins has reminded us,
"The transmission of spiritual wisdom may be the oldest
discipline in human history" (xiii). The question is rather
the relation of this ancient tradition of handing on
spiritual wisdom to the highly developed ways in which
modern society trains the next generation, especially
through its formalized academic institutions.
To my mind, the transmission of spirituality in the
first-order definition will, and should, take place primarily
outside academia within the traditions of spiritual training
which academics need to study but which they too often
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imitate at their own peril. I am frankly hesitant about how
much of a "practical" element can and should be
incorporated into the academic study of spirituality, both
within religious schools and in secular academic settings,
though I am convinced that for committed Christian
academics teaching itself is a spiritual discipline. A
number of the current projects concerning the study of
spirituality seem to involve confusions about the relation
between intellectual appropriation and personal
commitment that would be impossible to implement in
non-religious institutions and possibly unwise even in
religiously-affiliated institutions of higher learning.
Something of this seems to me present in Schneiders'
insistence on the "participative" dimension of the study of
spirituality ("Spirituality," 693-95).
These dangers kept in mind, however, it seems clear
that there is considerable consensus today among those
involved in the study of religion concerning the necessity
of incorporating spirituality, in some way, into the
curriculum. This is particularly evident among those who
view spirituality as spiritual theology. Numerous modern
theologians have reflected on the sad history of the
separation of theology and spirituality, that "diastase" that
Hans Urs von Balthasar traced back to the incipient
distinction of polemical and inner-churchly theologies in
the patristic period and which grew immeasurably worse in
the late Middle Ages due to the separation between the
rational theology of the Scholastics and the affective
theology of some mystics (See "Theologie und
Spiritualitiit," 577-84). For the Swiss theologian, the very
structure of the covenant between God and humanity
witnessed to in the Hebrew Bible requires the reintegration
of spirituality and theology. Reflection on Scripture,
especially the unity of dogmatic and paranetic teaching in
the Pauline letters, leads him to conclude: "On this basis
one can already ask oneself the question whether it makes
sense in the future to distinguish any longer between
theology and spirituality" (ibid. 586). We need not accept
the whole of von Balthasar's program for overcoming the
disjunction between spirituality and theology to use him as
a spokesman for agreement among contemporary
theologians concerning the need to bring theology and
spirituality back together (Cf. Bechtle 305-14). If theology
finds its ultimate purpose in the conversion of the subject,
as my teacher Bernard Lonergan argued, it seems
impossible to exclude spirituality from the task of religious
self-appropriation which Lonergan saw as theology's goal.
As Regina Bechtle noted, for Lonergan "knowing oneself
in relation to God and giving oneself over to the discipline
of transformation emerge as prerequisites and not just frills
for one who would do theology" (ibid. 308).
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Even those who do not wish to take a primarily
theological route into the study of religion, both in
religiously-affiliated and non-affiliated schools, have begun
to argue that spirituality should take a place in the
curriculum. Every religious tradition needs to understand
its past, and there is something that answers to the broad
description of spirituality in all religions, at least in the
sense that beliefs have always been practiced and were
always intended to be appropriated on a deep personal
level. This history of appropriation has often been
neglected in narrowly rational models of the study of
religious traditions that concentrated only on doctrines
and institutions. Spirituality may not be the only way to
correct this myopia, but it is certainly one way that should
not be neglected. From the perspective of the study of
religion in non-religious higher education, this historicalcontext approach to spirituality makes a particularly strong
case for the need to include spirituality in some way in the
curriculum.
To be sure, there are those, even among believers,
who doubt the wisdom of this. Bradley Hanson, for
example, questions whether spirituality can be taught
within a religiously-neutral academic environment because
of the degree of existential involvement spirituality always
entails (49-50). Precisely this issue of subjective interest, as
well as the admitted vagueness of the term, would lead
many non-religious educators to rule spirituality out as a fit
subject of study. But I want to argue against these
positions, claiming, as Walter Principe and others have
done, that spirituality can and should be an integral part of
the curriculum both within theological education and in
the humanistic study of religion.
To those who say that the "existential orientation"
entailed in spirituality is incompatible with the objectivity
that is at least the ideal of the humanistic education, I reply
that we need more adequate distinctions among various
kinds of existential orientations. In the religiously-related
school, existential orientation will mean one thing; it will
mean something rather different in a department of
religious studies or a non-church related Divinity School
like the one where I teach. Here the existential orientation
entailed in the study of spirituality need not be directed
either immediately or mediately to the student's own
religious life, but should at least include the student's
willingness to investigate a particular spirituality as one way
of expressing the central concerns of living the human
condition, however foreign that may be to him or her on a
personal level. Put more existentially, the study of
spirituality requires a desire to try to appreciate how
religious people actually live their beliefs.
In some ways I think the final question I wish to
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address, that is, how spirituality is to be taught, is the most
difficult and the one on which there may well be the most
disagreement. There have been a number of recent
articles that have set out programs for the incorporation of
spirituality into academic curricula. In 1981, Edward
Kinerk, using insights from Bernard Lonergan, suggested
that a curriculum for the study of spirituality could be
constructed by the application of questions for analysis that
would allow one to find the form of a spirituality, followed
by questions for comparison and contrast among
spiritualities that would eventually lead to questions for
evaluation (7-19). In 1989, James A. Wiseman advanced
another Lonerganian plan. Treating spiritual theology as a
"subject specialization" in the terms of Lonergan's Method
of Theology, he tried to show how the subject matter can be
specified by the use of the five categories of symbolic
expression that P.Joseph Cahill in his book Mended Speech,
identifies as the core of any religious tradition. The five
symbolic expressions are: ( 1) a body of normative
literature, such as the Bible; (2) theological formulations,
broadly taken; (3) visual art forms; (4) aural art forms; and
(5) popular devotions and the like. This subject matter
would then be approached through the mediation of
Lonergan's eight functional specializations (research,
interpretation, history, dialectic, foundations, doctrines,
systematics, communications. (Wiseman, 14 7-5 7). Walter
Principe's article also contains brief reflections on the
teaching of spirituality both from the theological
perspective and the history of religions point of view. More
recently, Sandra Schneiders has provided a rather detailed
picture, basically Ricouerian in inspiration, which treats
spirituality as an interdisciplinary "field-encompassing
field" which should be descriptive-critical, ecumenical,
holistic and participative. Each of these four programs has
merits. Read individually, each seems convincing, at least
in part; taken together, their considerable differences
demonstrate the problems of curricular development in an
area still so unsure of itself.
This is not the occasion for a detailed evaluation of
these plans and exactly why I would not want to implement
any one of them myself. This is not to deny the important
contribution they represent, nor to put a stop to the
discussion of exactly how to implement the teaching of
spirituality into the curriculum. However, I do want to go
on record with what may seem a rather anomalous
statement after my insistence on the importance of
spirituality for the teaching of religion; that is, I am not at
all sure that spirituality needs a separate niche in the
curriculum in order to be adequately assimilated. The
creation of programs of spirituality is an important part of
the process of giving spirituality the voice it deserves, but
need not be taken as the only way to achieve the goal.
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Speaking as a Christian theologian, I believe that it is
quite possible to teach spirituality effectively in and
through traditional disciplines such as theology, both
historical and constructive, ethics, and also the history of
Christianity. In saying this I do not mean to exclude other
disciplines, or the necessity of being open to non-Christian
forms of spirituality, especially because so much good
theology today is theology that is being done in dialogue
with other traditions. The reason for this has been well put
by von Balthasar when he says, "Nothing in the Church is
mere abstract principle: everything that is valid for all rests
on concrete persons, or better, on concrete talks entrusted
to concrete persons ... " ("The Gospel as Norm," 20). This
attention to the concrete person and the concrete task in
the study of religion-not just to institutional structures
and intellectual systems-necessarily implies what I
understand as spirituality. As long as we do not treat this
hunger for the concrete in an elitist fashion that would
narrow the scope of spirituality to the thought of a few
great masters, the incorporation of this perspective in our
teaching will help us be attentive to what we seem unable
not to call spirituality.
We may ask in closing how the efforts of believing
teachers and educators relate to first-order spirituality, that
is, to the personal appropriation of Christian faith. Each
teacher must have her or his answer to this question .
Generalization is particularly difficult here, perhaps
impossible. So let me instead tell two stories. The first
involves a vision of sorts, but contemporary vision that
might have been given to anyone concerned with the
teaching and dissemination of spirituality.
A Long Island commuter stands on a platform
watching trains speeding past each other east and west in
their rush towards what seem to be opposite goals. This
particular commuter happens to be a religious editor who
suddenly grasps this as an image of the mutual ignorance
and lack of connection between Eastern and Western
spiritual traditions. If only something could be done to get
the trains to slow down, he thinks, to stop, to converse
window-to-window, might they not realize that their
opposition is not as great as it seems? This sudd e n
illumination, a kind of modern analogy to Augustine's
third kind of vision (the intellectual vision discussed in the
twelfth book of the Literal Commentary on Genesis) , was the
actual beginning of the Classics of Western Spirituality
Series, which was originally designed to be one-half (60
volumes) of a joint enterprise called the Classics of Eastern
and Western Spirituality.
I doubt if the recipient of this commuter-vision would
want to describe himself as a mystic, despite his interest in
spiritual traditions. The astute among you will have
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noticed that the moment of illumination he was given did
not refer directly to God, but to the contemporary
audience of spiritual seekers. However, this moment of
enlightenment and the work lhat has gone into making it
at least partly real surely is not without relation to the
personal appropriation of belief on the part of the
hundreds of thousands who have profited from better
access to classical spiritual teaching, Jewish, Christian, and
Muslim. To hand on what we have been given, even
imperfectly, is to play a role.
Reflecting on this role reminds me of the story that
some of you may remember from the end of Gershom
Scholem's great book, Major Trends in jewish Mysticism.
Scholem says he heard it from the Hebrew novelist S. J.
Agnon. I conclude by quoting it in full:
When the Baal Shem had a difficult task before him, he
would go to a certain place in the woods, light a fire and meditate
in prayer--and what he had set out to perform was done. When a
generation later the 'Maggid' of Meseritz was faced with the same
task he would go to the same place in the woods and say: We can
no longer light the fire, but we can still speak the prayers-and
what he wanted done became reality. Again a generation later
Rabbi Moshe Leib of Sassov had to perform this task. And he too
went into the woods and said: We can no longer light the fire, nor
do we know the secret meditations belonging to the prayer, but we
do know the place in the woods to which it all belongs-and that
must be sufficient; and sufficient it was. But when another
generation had passed and Rabbi Israel of Rashin was called upon
to perform the task, he sat down on his golden chair in his castle
[obviously, he was an academic] and said: We cannot light
the fire, we cannot speak the prayers, we do not know the place, but
we can tell the story of how it was done. And, the story-teller adds,
the story which he told had the same effect as the actions of the other
three. 0
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As I watched "Wild Child for what must have been the fourth or fifth time, I found myself longing
for the periodic appearances of Madame Guerin. ltard's "teaching" seemed so brittle and severe
compared to Mme. Guerin's more sensible and sensitive ministrations. To long for Guerin is, I think,
to renew one's commitment to the affective dimension of teaching and learning. But we still lack an
adequate vocabulary for speaking about this matter without making it seem as though we are seeking
simply to "make people feel good about themselves." The wild child certainly felt better in the wild.
But was he better off there?

Mark Schwehn

22

The Cresset

LORD, HEAR-AND SEE-OUR PRAYER:
ARTISTIC PERFORMANCE AS EXPRESSION OF PERSONAL SPIRITUALITY

John Steven Paul
"Acting is Believing," Charles McGaw, late of the
Goodman School of Drama, entitled his famous basic
acting textbook. And, before we ask "Believing in what,
exactly?" we might pause to consider the word "believing."
The word takes us into a distinctly different realm of
actions from that in which we would find ourselves were
the phrase "acting is feeling," though that is surely what
some people want most from their actors-public,
projected feelings. In a brief passage of the Ars Poetica (685 BCE) directed to the actor, the Roman critic Horace
wrote that, if he is to make an audience weep, the actor
must first feel the grief himself (Carlson 24). Nor are we in
the realm of the intellectual, though certainly no small part
of the actor's preparation might fall under the title, "acting
is thinking." In the words of the nineteenth-century
English tragedian Henry Irving "a good understanding is as
necessary to a player as a pilot is to a vessel at sea" (Cole
and Chinoy 125) . Laurence Olivier would have countered
that acting is doing, a primarily physical exercise, since one
of his life-long mottoes was "the best way to begin to do a
thing is to do it."

John Steven Paul teaches theatre and is the Chair of the Division
of the Vzsual and Performing Arts at VU, where he also seroes as
advisor to Soul Purpose, VU's chancel drama troupe. His
extensive experience in directing this year resulted in King Lear,
as well as A Lesson from Aloes, and in the Christ College
Freshman Production, a yearly workshop presentation developed
and staged entirely by first year students in VU's Honors College.
For a number of years he has written occasional pieces on theatre
for The Cresset. This paper, the third presentation at the Lilly
Fellows Conference '92, wrapped around a performance by Soul
Purpose. The objective of this format was to reveal the integral
relationship between theory and practice in the work of this drama
troupe. The troupe performed •And They Danced, • a play by john
Steven Paul based on a sermon by The Rev. David H. Kehret and
developed in workshop by Soul Purpose. In the play, Jesus raises
his friend Lazarus from the dead after which a juyful celebration
takes place in Bethany. The right-justified text in this layout
attempts to bring that performance into the context of the paper
itself.
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McGaw's choice of the word "believing," however,
takes us into the spiritual domain. And, given the fact that
so many colleges and universities dedicate significant
resources to the study of acting and its associated theatre
arts, it is appropriate to talk about the teaching and
practice of acting at a conference with the theme
"spirituality and higher learning."
In 1987 Soul Purpose was founded at Valparaiso University.
The objectives of the group were 1) to provide students with the
opportunity to cumbine their love for theatre with their Christian
commitments, 2) to serve the Church by spreading the Good
News of Christ Crucified through the medium of theatre, and 3)
to create new works for the chancel drama repertoire.

We are, of course, not the first to focus on the
spiritual dimension of acting . Robert Benedetti has
devoted his useful survey of acting in the twentieth century,
Seeming, Being, and &coming, to the "perception of acting as
a necessary spiritual enterprise" (Benedetti 2). Jerzy
Grotowski of the Polish Laboratory Theatre, which
flourished in Cracow during the nineteen-sixties and
seventies deemed the actor "holy" and sought to elevate
him to a spiritual state (Benedetti 66). In his study The
Theatrical Event, David Cole likens the actor, first, to a
shaman who makes trance-journeys to the other world
where he presents the wishes of the community to the
gods, and then to the one who returns from the land of the
gods, spiritually possessed, to present the gods' words in
dramatic form to the community. We could go on citing
references to acting as a spiritual enterprise; spirituality is
something of a favorite theme of twentieth-century acting
philosophers. In the interests of reminding ourselves that
all philosophy is but a footnote to Plato, himself no lover of
the theatre, we might quote the Ion. Socrates, speaking to
the rhetorician: "Are you not carried out of yourself, and
does not your soul in an ecstasy seem to be among the
persons or places of which you are speaking .. ?" (Cole and
Chinoy 8)
So, there is, then, a long history of
emphasizing the spiritual dimension of acting.
Soul Purpose's first play was The Man Who Was Not Far
from the Kingdom of God, a dramatization of a story fly
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David Kehret, associate campus pastor at Valparaiso
University, based on Mark 12.28-34. In the story, an
unsuspecting young lawyer has a lifNhanging encounter with
the Son of God. The play was performed as a part of morning
services in churches and high schools. Like the lawyer, Soul
Purpose actors have been repeatedly surprised at their proximity
to the Kingdom of God as they have performed their plays in the
midst of God's peopk at warship.

There has been no more influential commentator on
the art of acting than Konstantin Stanislavski. Born in
Moscow in 1863 to a wealthy merchant family, Stanislavski's
whole life, from the time he acted in amateur theatricals
on his family's country estate, was devoted to actors and
acting. He is justly famous as the co-founder of the
Moscow Art Theatre, the origi.nal producer of Anton
Chekhov's major plays, and for his revolutionary approach
to the art of acting. More than an acting teacher or even a
systematic theorist, Stanislavski was like Socrates, a
pragmatic, persistent questioner guided by a single
question: how does the actor act? Stanislavski's efforts to
induce naturalistic performances from his actors echoes
the work of his Russian contemporary, the behavioral
psychologist Anton Pavlov. But Robert Benedetti asserts
that Stanislavski's most important contribution to
con temporary theatre was to "give us a focus on the
spirituality of the actor" (Benedetti 41).
Stanislavski articulated his system in a series of three
books, known as the "ABC's of Acting:" An Actor Prepares,
Building a Character, and Creating a Rot£. The first of these
alone could constitute an acting curriculum for years of
study. In An Actor Prepares, Stanislavski states his aim: ...
not only to create the life of the human spirit, but also to
express it in a beautiful, artistic form" (Stanislavski 15).
The system itself is comprised of ten components, the most
famous of which is "Emotion Memory" (also translated as
"sense memory" or "affective memory") in which the actor
calls to consciousness an emotion from her own life
analogous to the one being experienced by the character
she is portraying. Using his system (which, by the way, he
reportedly never thought of as a system, per se, while he was
teaching), Stanislavski taught the actor to metamorphose
her own self into a new self by the power of the
experiences of the character. The experiences were to be
happening as if to the actor herself. "Metamorphose" is
Robert Benedetti's term and he uses it, he writes, literally
to mean meta-morphose, a form above or a transcendent
reality.
The Soul Purpose plays are designed to be played in the space
surrounding the all.ar. If we're furtunate several steps kad to
the chancel and improve the sight-lines! Like liturgical
cekbrants, the actors perfurm in that sacred space between God's
tab!£ and the peopk in the pews. Here they offer to God their
prayers and those of the peopk and they bring the wurd of God
to the congregation. They repeatedly report, following
performances, a rare feeling that can only be described as
transcendence.
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An Actor Prepares is composed in the form of a series of
acting lessons with several students directed by "M.
Tortsov," the voice of Stanislavski. Each chapter of the
book takes up a different part of what has come to be
known as "the system:" relaxation, concentration, given
circumstances, imagination, and so forth. Two of the later
chapters in the English translation by Elizabeth Reynolds
Hapgood are entitled "Faith and a Sense of Truth"
(chapter VIII) and "Communion" (chapter X). We would
not be wrong to expect a spiritual emphasis in chapters
with titles such as these.
In the chapter on scenic truth, one of Tortsov's
students protests "I don't see how there can be any
question of truth in the theatre since everything about it is
fictitious, beginning with the very plays of Shakespeare and
ending with the papier mache dagger with which Othello
stabs himself." Tortsov counsels the student not to be
concerned about the material from which the prop dagger
has been made. "Of significance to us," he says,
is the reality of the inner life of a human spirit in a part and a
belief in that Tl!ality. We are not concerned with the actual naturalistic
existence of what surrounds us on the stage, the reality of the material
wurld! [ ... ] Put life into all the imagined circumstances and

actions until you have completely satisfied your sense of truth,
and until you have awakened a sense of faith in the reality of your
sensations . . . . Truth on stage is whatever we can believe in with
sincerity, whether in ourselves ur in our colkagues. Truth cannot be
separated from belief, nor belief from truth. They cannot exist
without each other and without both of them it is impossible to
live your part or create anything. (121-122)

!nAnd They Danced, jesus's friends and disciples look on in
astonishment as he calls furth Lazarus from the tomb. The play
is divided into three sections: 1) the events surrounding the
resurrection itself, 2) the joyous celebration following the
resurrection, and 3) a meditation on the ksson to be learned
from the story of Lazarus. The players begin in simple black
and white costume. Fur the celebration they each don three items
of gaudily-colored party clothing. During the meditation, the
players gradually shed the party-clothes, returning to their black
and white.

Stanislavski's approach to creating a scenic truth in
which an actor could believe was first to break down a large
action into its component parts and then direct the actor
to focus on each of these smaller actions in sequence. To
bake a loaf of bread is an example of a large action
consisting of many individual steps. Within each step, the
actor comes into contact with many discrete material
objects: ingredients, utensils, equipment. In their training
regimen, Stanislavski's students were not given any stage
properties with which to work. (A radical idea in a period
where the Naturalistic style dictated that stage settings be
chock-full of environmental minutiae.) They were told to
work "with air." After a time, the students would come to
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recall just how they had taken the physical action on which
they were focusing in real life. Through a combination of
imagination, concentration, faith, and recall the students
came to believe in the truth of the moment.
And They Danced begins with a funeral preparation.
Lazarus is dead. Against roerybody 's hopes, Lazarus is dead.
Esther is methodically preparing a casserole meaL Her actions
are mimed. She reads the recipe instructions aloud to herself
"Four double handfuls of bulgar wheat,
steamed until it cracks open.
A measure offlour.
A pinch of salt.
A pinch of dried herbs, rubbed together
and sprinll.led into the mixture.
One egg, beaten.
Enough broth to give it moisture.
Mix to~ther.
Prepare another bowl .. ..
Rub around with olive oiL
Press a clove ofgarlic into the surface.
Place first mixture into the new bowl.
Firm down.
Sprinll.le bread crumbs over the top.
Pat in.
Place a damp towel over bowl. "

An essential step in the creation of scenic truth is
opening and sustaining communion among the actors en
ensemble. Stanislavski defines communion as "spiritual
intercourse," which occurs when one is giving to and
receiving something from an object. An "object" here does
not refer to an inanimate thing, rather it is an umbrella
term which might also be translated as "an other." Among
the "others" with which actors seek to be in communion
are 1) other parts of themselves, 2) other objects (actual or
imaginary), 3) other actors, and 4) the others in the
audience.
"With whom or with what are you in communion at
this moment," Tortsov abruptly asks a student at the
beginning of a lesson. "Why, not with anyone or anything,"
the student replies. "You must be a marvel," the amused
master responds, "if you are able to continue in that state
for long." In the waking moments of life, according to
Stanislavski, human beings are in communion with
something or someone nearly all of the time. One of the
students reports that he had difficulty "communing" with a
string quartet while it was performing a famous piece of
music. The young man felt that he was distracted by the
chandelier hanging in the auditorium. Tortsov counters
that the student was in communion with this particular
lighting fixture:
You were trying to find out how and of what that object was
made. You absorbed its form, its general aspect, and all sorts of
details about it. You accepted these impressions, entered them in
your memory, and proceeded to think about them. That means
that you drew something from your object, and we actors look
upon that as necessary. You are worried about the inanimate
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quality of your object. Any picture, statue, photograph of a
friend, or object in a museum is inanimate, yet it contains some
part of the life the artist who created it. Even a chandelier can, to
a certain degree, become an object of lively interest, if only
because of our absorption in it. (184)
The problem for the actor is to stimulate this kind of
communion on stage.
At the height of the celebration of Lazarus's resurrection, at the
height of singing and the dancing, the gaudily costumed actors
realiu that none of the joy that they are experiencing would
have been theirs had Lazarus not first have died. To signify
their understanding of this truth, each actor deliberately,
agonizingly removes an item of party-clothing- a scarf, a vest,
a hat - and wistfully drops the object. Each of these has a
material reality and a symbolic reality. They are happily
familiar with these pieces of clothing and it's frightening to give
them up. More than clothing, they are fragments of an old life
which must be buried so that new life can be born.

Stanislavski's approach to this problem begins by
making his actors aware of the types of communication of
which they are capable because of their "spiritual
resources." One type is communication with actual objects
on stage, similar to the way it happens in off-stage life.
Another type is that which communications theorists would
call "intra-personal." Here Stanislavski identifies a center
of vital energy located near the solar plexus which, he says,
the Hindus call "Prana." The actor "communes with
himself on the stage" by opening communication between
the brain "the cerebral centre ... and the nerve center of
the solar plexus-the seat of emotion" (Stanislavski 187).
Actors may also commune with imaginary or non-existent
objects, such as apparitions. Such communion is
particularly difficult to achieve and often results in actors
only "representing" (a particularly negative term for
Stanislavski) themselves in such communion.
As might be expected, Stanislavski devotes much of
this chapter to achieving communion between actors.
"Spiritual intercourse" between actors may be achieved by
means of external, visible resources; that is, the sensory
faculties, but also through the wordless interchange of
feeling. He is at a loss to articulate this process:
My difficulty here is that I have to talk to you about
something I feel but do not know. It is something I have
experienced and yet I cannot theorize about it. . . . What name
can we give to these invisible currents, which we use to
communicate with one another? Some day this phenomenon will
be the subject of scientific research. Meantime let us call them
rays. (199-200)
Note that Stanislavski sought to teach actors how to
enter into spiritual intercourse with one another not as
themselves but as the dramatic characters into which they
had transformed themselves. Such transformation was
accomplished identifYing the character's feelings and then
finding analogous feelings in their own lives, thus fusing
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actor with character. The feelings transmitted would be
personal ones but in the form of the character's feelings.
This is an immensely difficult accomplishment, but when
actors do achieve the desired communion it is always
between, for example, Hamlet and Ophelia, rather than
between Branaugh and Thompson.
As difficult as communion is to achieve between
actors it is "even more difficult [to establish] mutual
communion with a collective object; in other words, the
public" ( Stanislavski 191). It was actors' pre-occupation
with the audience that Stanislavski sought to overcome
through his teaching. He believed that in order to achieve
truth on the stage, to achieve communion among
themselves, actors would have to stop playing to the
audience. This seemed a radical even ridiculous idea at
the time. What else, after all, were actors for, if not for
playing to an audience? Stanislavski had no intention of
severing the actor-audience relationship, indeed he sought
to deepen it. What he wanted from actors was total,
relaxed concentration within and upon the objects of the
stage environment.
This concentration could be
maintained only through a paradoxical state he called
"public solitude, "a moment of communion with an object
so complete that it shut out an audience that might be a
little as two or three yards away. In this way, communion
with the audience was achievable, not directly or
consciously but indirectly and unconsciously:
When the spectator is present during such an emotional
and intellectual exchange, he is like a witness to a conversation.
He has a silent part in the exchange of feelings, and is excited by
their experiences. But the spectators in the theatre can
understand and indirectly participate in what goes on on stage
only while this intercourse continues among the actors. (186)
Stanislavski asserts that the audience "wishes, above
all, to believe everything that happens on stage"
(Stanislavski 126). To borrow a phrase, the audience is
quite willing to suspend its disbelief in return for the
opportunity to enter into a spiritual intercourse with the
actors in the mutual creation of scenic truth.

The purpose of Soul Purpose is to bring the truth of Christ
crv.ci[zed to God's peaple. At times this purpose is best served l7y
making direct contact with the audience during the course of
the play. The actors occasionally step out of character
consciously attempting to deepen their communion with the
audience while maintaining it with one another.

The sub-title of this presentation is "Artistic
Performance as Expression of Personal Spirituality." One
of the assumptions underlying the work of Soul Purpose is
that acting can be viewed as an expression of personal
spirituality. Acting for Soul Purpose is a form of prayer,
but one integrally connected to Stanislavski's views on the
spiritual aspects of acting.
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Stanislavski, a thorough-going aesthete, believed in
the truth of art without need for external referents. "Truth
on the stage," Stanislavski wrote, "is whatever we can
believe in with sincerity, whether in ourselves or in our
colleagues." Our creed is similar: "We believe in all things,
seen and unseen." When Soul Purpose performs a play
based on a scriptural text or elaborates a story from the
Bible- that is, when we fill in Stanislavski's blank whatever
with the phrase "the body and blood of Christ"- the
terms belief, faith, truth, and communion take on a new
and different meaning. Yet we do not leave the actor's
discipline behind. Indeed, Stanislavski's beliefs and our
own are mutually informative and equally important in the
creation of truly Christian religious drama.
Were we to replace Stanislavski's whatever with the
truth of Sophocles or Shakespeare, or Chekhov, or Sam
Sheppard we would not be undermining or diluting the
essential spirituality of the actor's art. What Soul Purpose
and I suggest, however, is that when whatever becomes the
Gospel of Christ then acting is more than communing with
objects real or imagined, with self, with ensemble,
environment or the audience; it is communion with God.
That communion, accomplished by grace, through faith
and the wondrous Stanislavski System, is attained through a
form of communication which we more often refer to as
prayer.
The actors of Soul Purpose pray at times in solitude,
sometimes in public solitude, often in concert with the
audience. They hope they will not be accused of praying
ostentatiously like the Pharisee in the Temple. Their
prayers are solitary, concentrated, contemplative. They are
also public; prayed in communion with God, their
ensemble, and their audiences, also known as
congregations of worshippers, who, more than anything
else, wish, above all, to believe everything that happens on
stage. 0
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WRITING IN THE DARK:
THE SHOWINGS

AND POLITICS OF DENISE LEVERTOV

James Champion

A world order that commits planetary suicide in the search for profit while
driving the majority of human beings into despair and poverty is a
!tilling/producing machine without spiritual center.
Joel Kovel, History and Spirit
Where can we feel this new reality 1 We cannot find it; but it can find us.
It tries to find us during our whole life.
Paul Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations
Keep writing in the dark:
a record of the night, or
words that pulled you from depths of unknowing
Denise Levenov, Candles in Babylon

Denise Levertov came to the attention of her first
generation of readers largely through The New American
Poetry, a popular anthology of innovative post-War writing.
After appearing in 1960, the book was often reprinted. In
1982, it was refurbished with the title The Postmoderns: The
New American Poetry Revised, a revision that speaks volumes
about contemporary winds of literary change. On the one
hand, the term "postmodern" rightly names ways in which
Levertov and her contemporaries-Robert Creeley and
Allen Ginsberg, for instance-were already, in the late
1950s, diverging from their modernist precursors, Ezra
Pound and William Carlos Williams. Yet, at another level,
the term "postmodern" is, bluntly put, a marketing event.
James Champion has completed the first year of his term as a
Lilly Fellow in Humanities and the Arts. A native of Canada, his
PhD in Religion and Literature is from Emory University. He has
published in the Journal of Literature and Theology,
Religion and Intellectual Life, and Soundings. During the
previous year, he has taught a variety of courses in the
Departments of English and Theolog;y, and in the Christ College
Freshman Program. In the coming year, in addition to teaching
and searching for an appointment following his fellowship,
Professor Champion will continue work on a book-length study of
interpretation theory in relation to works by George Eliot, William
Faulkner and Denise Levertov.
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In fact, since there are few features of postmodern art and
writing that cannot be found in such figures as Marcel
Duchamp and James Joyce, one sometimes wonders
whether what is touted as postmodernism in our day is not
really modernism reinventing and remarketing itself. In
any case, as our late twentieth-century aesthetic habits
undergo change, postmodernism displays, with a sly twist,
the same audacity modernism always did show-the audacity, in Pound's admonishing words, to "make it new."
I offer these remarks with the aim of framing a background for reading Denise Levertov today. In surprising
ways, such contexts inform the religious turn her work has
taken, and it is that poetic shift which I wish to highlight in
the following discussion. Just as Levertov, throughout her
career, has focused keenly on aesthetic, political, and spiritual contexts, they warrant consideration when approaching her own work.
When Levertov's poetry is mentioned in the same
breath as postmodernism, for example, it helps to find a
context for the sort of postmodernism evoked. David
Griffin, in an introduction to a series ofworks on postmodernist thought, has made a distinction between "eliminative" and "revisionary" postmodernism that can be useful
here. Where eliminative postmodernism "overcomes the
modern worldview" by deconstructing the ingredients
"God, self, purpose, meaning, a real world, and truth as
correspondence," the revisionary variety seeks instead to
construct a new worldview through a renewed understanding of "modern premises and traditional concepts."
Revisionary postmodernism, according to Griffin, tries to
overcome those features of the modern world-such as
individualism and militarism-that are leading to ecological devastation. It sets its sights on "a new unity of scientific, ethical, aesthetic, and religious intuitions" (Griffin x).
Such a position incorporates spirituality, rather than scorning current spiritual expressions as so much subjective nostalgia. It is on this latter point especially that Levertov can
be aligned with Griffin's revisionary postmodern thinking.
For increasingly she has integrated spirituality into her politics and her poetic enterprise.
Such integration did not come with an overnight con27

version; it has followed gradually from a steady deepening
of this poet's genuinely humanistic bent. But if not
marked by sudden conversion, there is something new and
distinctly religious in Levertov's poetry of the 1980s. It is
the kind of development critics quickly mistake for a
retreat into orthodoxy and convention. Religious commitment-so the kneejerk assumption goes-must be reactionary somehow, a backwards step probably explainable by
the prevailing temper of those years. This was a decade,
after all, in which poets who had rebelled in the 1960s, like
Allen Ginsberg, were becoming respectable members of
the academy they had once disdained.
This explanation doesn't fit Levertov. She has simply
traveled an alternate path. From Candles in Babylon ( 1982)
to her recent collection, Evening Train (1992), she has continued to understand her work in terms of a pilgrimage.
Rather than endorse either the conservative or the subversive posturings in contemporary writing, her route has led
her around the skirmishes between various positions in the
poetic field. An example is the war (of periodical proportions) fought between the L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poets, who
espouse "eliminative" postmodernism (a group I will return
to in a moment), and a growing neo-formalist movement
that wants poetry to return to the good old days of traditional versification. Levertov, meanwhile, has gone on her
way continuing to work against reactionary poetic practice,
on the one hand, while, on the other, avoiding the trap of
collapsing all language into a one-dimensional play of
signs. Her aim is different: by opening up space for an
interplay of sacramental symbols and prophetic criticism in
her poems, she has sought to witness against the multifarious oppressions of our times, yet also to receive language
in moments of embodied illumination.
Levertov's direction can be made clearer by contrasting her views on such issues as poetic image and poetic
voice with those of the L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poets (for
practical purposes, cited as the Language school). These
writers have attempted in recent years to deconstruct all
settled notions of meaning and to expose a great many lies
about the so-called imaginative writer. Their prototypical
gesture is the dispersal of the self. With the speaking subject of poetry displaced, parody then becomes the prime
imaginative mode. For poets such as Ron Silliman and
Charles Bernstein, this is the mode demanded by our contemporary situation. What used to be called "culture," they

say, has today become a "mediascape" with nothing transcendent above, below, or behind it. According to the
Language school, there can be no origin of meaning when
images refer only to other images. This phenomenon of
an endless simulation of images is the irreversible result of
their electronic processing. In other words, when images
are incessantly mediated by cinema, television, and video,
the traditional idea that a creative human subject makes
the images no longer applies.
The disappearance of the author as "genius" and the
impotence of the "authentic" image in the face of technologically reproducible ones signal a fundamental change.
One commentator, Richard Kearney, summarizes this
development in terms of the way imagination is increasingly figured today: "we find both the classical metaphor of
the mirror reflecting the sun (Plato's Republic) and the modern metaphor of the lamp projecting its own light from
within human subjectivity (Kant's Critique of Pure Reason)
being subsumed into the postmodern metaphor of circular
looking glasse~ach reflecting the surface images of the
other in a play of infinite multiplication (Derrida's
Dissemination) " ( 8) .
Levertov responds to this state of imaginative affairs
from a standpoint that calls into question the predominant
metaphor. She has focused less upon positioning herself
in relation to various schools than upon the task of revisioning the imagination. Though she no longer belongs
to a particular school (as she was once associated with
Black Mountain), she can be aligned with artists whose
vision is currently drawn away from the endless play of surfaces and signs to those horizons where the question of the
sacred portends. In the process, she offers distinctive views
on authorship and on the nature and possibilities of image.
While she is no stranger to the play of proliferating words
on the flat page or to the task of undercutting the selfenclosure of the authorial ego--it was already a key concern of the Black Mountain poets-she intuits options
besides the shattering of the subject into language.
Drawing on a number of traditions, including the Hasidic
and the Christian, she responds to the contemporary crisis
of imagination by continuing to explore the possibilities of
poesis, that is, of making a world in which we may poetically
dwell. Kearney, in Poetics of Imagining, describes this position as a counter-cultural one: it holds, even today, "that

For Victor to "know" what "milk" is, his teacher insists that he recognize the word "milk." To teach
Victor about spirituality, would the teacher give him words like "cross," "altar," "holy water," and
"wafer" (not to be confused with "bread")? Although much knowledge rests with a knower's ability to
link concrete and linguistic realities, spiritual knowledge includes realities like "grace," "forgiveness,"
and "faith." The current educational climate of assessment, however, encourages a concrete view of
knowledge, edging out those things which are "known" but cannot be measured. With this view of
knowledge, the direction of spiritual education is unclear. In other words, assuming Victor acquires a
knowledge of "milk," would he be able or willing to learn about "grace"?
Beth Hoger
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imagining is a mode of being-in-th~world which makes and
remakes our Lebenswelt by disclosing new possibilities of
meaning" (10).
Repeatedly in Levertov's prose writings, one comes
upon claims for the imagination as a mode of awareness
essential to human life. For instance, in "A Note on the
Work of the Imagination" (1961) she describes imagination as "that breathing of life into the dust, [which] is pr~
sent in us all embryonically-manifests itself in the life of a
dream-and in that manifestation shows us the possibility:
to permeate, to quicken, all of our life and the works we
make" (Poet, 205). In "An Admonition" she calls for a poetry "of embodiment, incarnation ... in which the personages may be of myth or of Monday, no matter, if they are of
the living imagination" (Poet, 61). In a collection of poems
from 1960, With Eyes in the Back of Our Heads, imagination
becomes a dark, mysterious force, while in her next work,
The Jacob's Ladder (1961) it is thought of as light.
Throughout these various interrogations, however, imagination is always found to be embodied within us.
In Levertov's more recent, religious verse, the imagination maintains primacy of place. This is manifestly the
case in the collection, Breathing the Water ( 1987). In a series
of "Showings" that closes this work, the poet enters into the
life, conflicts, and even the particular visions of the fourteenth-century figure, Julian of Norwich. There is an insistence throughout this sequence on disclosing the
contradictions of experience. Yet the poet also notes
strange reversals that can occur between contraries, such as
visibility and invisibility. The final "showing" is startling. It
begins with an image of Julian herself "laughing aloud,
glad I with a most high inward happiness." The poem
then becomes an address and a call to this mystic across
centuries of affliction:
She lived in dark times, as we do:
war, and the Black Death, hunger, strife,
torture, massacre. She knew
all of this, she felt it
sorrowfully, mournfully
shaken as men shake
a cloth in the wind.

Butjulian,Julian1 tum to you:
you clung to joy though tears and sweat
rolled down your face like the blood
you watched pour down in beads unaccountable
as rain from the eaves:

clung like an acrobat, by your teeth, fiercely,
to a cobweb-thin high wire, your certainty
ofinfmite mercy, witnessed
with your own eyes, ...
(81-82)

In the intensity of this moment, Julian becomes the poet's
companion of imagination. The fullness of the encounter
suggests transfiguration, yet without any need to explain
the event with psychological motivations or doctrinal
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truths. It is a stance typical of Levertov-the same stance
evident in a talk she gave (in 1990) at a symposium on the
topic of "Faith and Works." In that address, we do not find
her declaring the tenets of her Christian belief, but rather
discussing her poems which acknowledge the nuances of
doubt, "poems written on the road to an imagined destination offaith" (158).
Imagination, for Levertov, is the force that enables
the writer to mediate what she once called "presentness."
This phenomenon does not arise from the act of registering many concrete things in a poem (contrary to the conventional wisdom of creative writing programs). The
mediation of "presentness" is, first of all, a process that
requires an involved reader. In "trust," the reader can
grant a poem ontological status by responding to its capacity to propose a world-its capacity, that is, to refer to the
real by recreating the real in a new sphere of related meanings.
For re-creation to occur, this "new sphere" also
demands form, but form as crafted by the shaping imagination, not as superinduced. Just how form can be intrinsically related to content is a question that has occupied
Levertov throughout her writing life. She has ventured a
number of articles on the topic, and on the related issue of
"organic form." She has written on technical matters, such
as "the function of the line," while also discussing ongoing
changes in her own poetic structures. After moving to
America in 1948, she was initially influenced by William
Carlos Williams, a mentor who admonished her (in his letters) to pare down her language and to discover "hidden
intrinsic form." Over four decades later, Levertov continues her inquiry into "exploratory form"; this is a term
derived from Gerard Manley Hopkins, a figure she has
recently turned to in order to articulate interconnections
between perception and design (Marten 13).
While Levertov has had other major influences on the
matter of form, the most important overall remains the
Black Mountain school. In particular, the impact of
Charles Olson's theory of"Projective Verse" must be noted.
Olson's concept of the poetic line as breath-spaced, and his
notion of "composition by field"-rather than by "inherited" rules about line and stanza-opened up possibilities
for new forms in a decisive way. By implication, his sense
of poetry as an act of being enlarged the very condition of
language and thought for a number of poets of Levertov's
generation. In reaction against enervated verse tied to outmoded conventions, Olson's shifting of the poetic ground
provided a much-needed catalyst for experimentation with
line-breaks, line-placement, and free-verse cadences. A
poetry fundamentally open in its construction was especially germane for Levertov, given her propensity for focusing
urgently on the immediate. Her sense of the poem as discovery-as a communicative procedure in its very construction-is nullified by formal platitudes that look first to a
final product
Along with open form and composition by field,
Levertov derives from Olson and the Black Mountain
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school support for her impulse to challenge the limits of
the lyric ego. This challenge stems, in part, from a reaction
against the predominance in American poetry of the "confessional" school (Robert Lowell, Sylvia Plath, John
Berryman, and others). While confessional poetry at its
best does much more, at its worst it tends to be governed
by a voice that speaks of its own sensitivity and constantly
posits a self to be regarded. Against that tendency
Levertov, Robert Duncan, Creeley, and Olson sought to get
outside the self and to let go of the unitary, authoritative
ego in their poems. Olson, for example, after denouncing
"the lyrical interference of the individual as ego," attempts
"to wash the ego out" in the cosmology of The Maximus
Poems ("Proprioception," 182). Or one thinks of Jack
Spicer's efforts to suspend completely the "I" to allow for a
literal "dictation" of the Other. Levertov certainly does not
go as far as Olson or Spicer in letting go of the controlling,
authorial voice. At the same time, she shares with Spicer
what he calls, in After Lorca, "a need for a poetry that [is]
more than the expression of my hatreds and desires" (51).
In other words, Levertov does not want merely to traffic in
a solipsistic poetic voice that displays wit and confesses
moods, while mistaking arbitrary, private associations for
discovery. Such verse, always to be found in enormous
quantities, renders poetry innocuous by treating it as merely ornamental to thought.

Fonns the Spirit Enters
Levertov criticizes ornamental poetry in "An
Admonition" (1964). She reinforces her attack by quoting
Wordsworth to the effect that "language is not the dress
but the incarnation of thought" (Poet, 16). That she "really
means the incarnational metaphor," as one critic puts it,
and that the metaphor carries theological tenor for her has
become increasingly apparent over passing years (Breslin,
147). Similar intimations emerge in her proposal to alter
Creeley's famous formula: "Form is never more than the
extension of content." Levertov's version, "Form is never
more than the revelation of content" (Poet, 60) divulges an
element in her thinking that turns up in her earliest
poems: namely, a certain "sacramentality," which, time and
again, directs her attention to something numinous in the
most ordinary things.
Levertov's sacramental sense often finds purely secular occasions for expression. For instance, there are no
standard signals of the sacred in the opening stanzas of
"Pleasures":
I like to find
what's not found
at once, but lies
within something of another nature,
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in repose, distinct.
Gull feathers of glass, hidden
in white pulp: the bones of squid
which I pull out and lay
blade by blade on the draining boardtapered as if for swiftness, to pierce
the heart, but fragile, substance
belying design.
"Pleasures" is found in With Eyes in the Back of Our
Heads, a collection from 1960. Its tone and setting are very
different from the following poem, "This Day," which
appears in Oblique Prayers (1984). The Christian sacrament
itself is present in the opening words of this second poem:
Dry wafer,
sour wine.

This day I see
God's in the dust,
not sifted
out from confusion.
Over the course of this poem, both transcendent and mundane things come to be acknowledged. Gradually, the poet
lets go of an impulse to impose her own mental state on
the sacrament and her own design on the transpiring day.
Order and rigid certainties are let g~but that is when the
substantial arrives. "Something of another nature," spoken
of in "Pleasures," does appear:
this day I see
the world, a word
intricately incarnate, offers-ravelled, honeycombed, veined, stainedwhat hunger craves,
a sorrel grass,
a crust,
water,
salt.
(80-81)

Levertov is not inclined to deploy sacramental images
in her work because in some formal arrangements taste
requires them. Rather, such images are experientially rooted and timed. They grow out of, accompany, and articulate the author's "sense of life as a pilgrimage" (Poet 63).
In other words, her sacramentality forms one of the deep
roots of her life's work, and it is entwined with her poetic
in existential ways. For example, while Levertov's struggle
to downplay the ego in lyric poetry owes much to Black
Mountain aesthetics and to a project of de-centering
shared with Creeley and Duncan, her goal of attaining a
different disposition of self has religious sources too.
The Cresset

Going outside the self becomes, finally, not an aesthetic
program-nor a celebration of the death of the subjectbut rather, an uncovering of the "relationship of self to the
world" (Marten, 5). Within the living language of that relationship, a poem can become, according to Levertov, "the
poet's means of summoning the divine" (Poet in the World,
47).
In any discussion of Levertov's religious roots, some
unusual biographical factors should be mentioned. She
herself often remarks on the sensuousness of her childhood in Wales. Moreover, she recollects a practice of spiritual intuition which she traces to her Welsh mother's
strong mystical heritage. In a sense, these factors combine
in the poem "The Instant," from Overland to the Islands
(1958). Writing in the present tense in this work, the
author captures, through the eyes of a child, a moment of
illumination that impresses itself upon her during an
excursion with her mother. The scene is quickly set: the
two walkers become engrossed in a sensuous gathering of
mushrooms, while the normal boundaries of valley and sky
are distorted by an enveloping mist. The mother is sud-·
denly startled by a distant vision: "It is Eryri!" It is the legendary Welsh name the mother calls out in excitement, as
the peak of Mt. Snowdon is briefly illumined "fifty I miles
away." For an instant, the mystical "home I of eagles, resting place of I Merlin, core of Wales," bursts into awareness.
For an epiphanic second, "Light graces the mountainhead
I for a lifetime's look, before the mist / draws in again"
(Collected Earlier Poems, 66). Here in this fleeting narrative
is an archetypal pattern of an encounter with the "core" of
the ineffable, a pattern of spiritual adventure that repeatedly turns up in Levertov's oeuvre.
If Levertov's mystical interests were fostered by those
of her mother, her father's Hasidic background must have
supplemented the effect. In short, Paul Levertoffs influence on the author is also strong. That he was a Russian
Jew who became an Anglican priest is noteworthy. Most
remarkable, though, is what Denise Levertov relates about
her father in her Biographical Note in The New American
Poetry: "His lifelong hope was towards the unification of
Judaism and Christianity. He was ... author of a Life of St.
Paul in Hebrew, part translator of The Zohar [into English]"
(440). That this interest amounted to more than a scholarly pastime is confirmed by a number of stories. One item
of evidence is Levertov's report that her parents made their
home a center for receiving and relocating jewish refugees
from Naziism before World War II.
It makes little sense, no doubt, to draw a one-to-one
correspondence between the ideas of parent and child. Yet
it is tempting to speculate on ways Paul Levertoffs passionate concern with two religions could have influenced
Denise Levertov's thought. For one thing, it would have
contributed to the richness of the intellectual, artistic, and
political environment in which she grew up, and which she
has often fondly recalled. But beyond that, I wonder
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whether the father's conjoining of one religion, which
claims that the decisive event in history has happened, with
one that says it has not, is one source of the daughter's
capacity to think both in terms of "always already" and "not
yet."
For along with Denise Levertov's sacramental sense of
what is "given," we often find poems that speak out about
the justice that is not. This is the prophetic element in
Levertov's thought, an element that has informed her life
as an activist-writer committed to social protest. Viewed
from another angle, it is the facet of her poetics that leads
her to include "A Speech: For Antidraft Rally, D.C." in the
same collection (Candles in Babylon) as "Mass for the Day of
St. Thomas Didymous." It is why, in a recent volume, A
Door in the Hive ( 1989), we find "Annunciation," a celebration of Mary, but also "Land ofDeath-Squads."
One reason to call Levertov's social and political criticism prophetic is that it does not offer utopian solutions.
The phenomenon watched for is idolatry in whatever form
it appears-including political hyperactivism. In what this
poet calls our "Age of Terror," the goal is less a matter of
offering blueprints for social change than it is to sustain
hope. The goal is to create what Wassily Kandinsky, in
Concerning the Spiritual in Art, calls "another art," an art
"capable of further developments" and which "possesses ...
an awakening prophetic power" (26). One place to
glimpse such a power is in the first poem (also the title
poem) of Candles in Babylon:
Through the midnight streets of Babylon
between the steel towers of their arsenals,
between the torture castles with no windows,
we race by barefoot, holding tight
our candles, trying to shield
the shivering flames, crying
'Sleepers Awake!'
hoping
the rhyme's promise was true,
that we may return
from this place of terror
home to a calm dawn and
the work we had just begun.
As a single voice keeps alive the ethical imagination in the

condition of exile, this poem turns on the word and the
possibility of "hope." We learn that it is not the hope of an
isolated individual, but hope that must be lived out with
others. Nor is it a delusional belief that the enemy can be
conquered; the principalities that rule by torture are always
too powerful for that. But in the depth of this darkness, a
power remains to resist it. In keeping alive the memory of
the calm center and of freedom from domination, these
things are possessed paradoxically in an awakened power
of anticipation.
In one of its facets, Levertov's prophetic concern is to
write "a record of the night." At root, this is a refusal to put
poetry into the service of beautification when it is "the
global panorama of oppression and violence" that must be
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shown ("Work that Enfaiths," 153). In the mid and late
1960s, this stance resulted in a series of works examining
and protesting the Vietnam War. A number of poems in
The Sorrow Dance (1967)-in particular, "Life at War"depict incomprehensible atrocities with extreme images.
The poet reveals the complicity of the political state, while
also bringing "the war home" to her readers in an attempt
to summon people to action. Relearning the Alphabet (1970)
confronts the interrelated problems of racism, imperialism,
poverty, and war; using disjunctive language, here too the
poet tries to get beyond mere didacticism by struggling to
find new forms of expression adequate to widely felt "political anguish." In To Stay Alive ( 1971), Levertov explores a
number of political questions, the daily ambiguities of radical action, the tensions of revolutionary protest, andalways looming-the issue of death. As Paul Lacey points
out, To Stay Alive attempts in particular to integrate conscience and poetic utterance. This work thereby becomes a
key step for Levertov on her way towards an "osmosis of the
personal and the public, of assertion and of song" ( 64).
In response to Levertov's anti-war verse, a number of
critics over the years have charged her with distorting the
nature of poetry. For instance, Charles Altieri, in Enlarging
the Temple, launches an attack upon Levertov and "the limits of the aesthetics of presence." While some of Levertov's
anti-war poems certainly fail, it is not because, as Altieri has
it, "she tries to adapt the principles that have shaped her
work to social questions" (226). The underlying complaint
seems to be that Levertov has included within the province
of poetry something that, by definition, doesn't belong.
Poets should recognize a greater gulf between the imagination's "song" and empirical reality. But such a view is, finally, another "ornamental" one, however sincere it may be in
refining poetry's high art. By contrast, Levertov's prophetic song allows for indictment as well as celebration. While
failing sometimes, her deeper instinct is to keep waiting for
those moments--hardly detached from the social worldwhen something of spiritual substance breaks through
form.
In one of his prose writings, the poet Philip Larkin
poses the question, "What remains when disbelief has
gone?" (98). The question nicely reverses the one more
endemic to the modern world: namely, what remains after
the loss of Faith, Nietzsche's "death of God," et cetera. The
insinuation that disbelief can be lost renders relative the
dark "truth" of the modem world.
Whether we are today in a modem or postmodem
era, our relationship to belief and disbelief is more dialectical than either the despisers of religion or the authoritarians within religion would have it. Both groups resent, so to
speak, the inefficiency of this unsettled predicament.
Perhaps that is why Levertov, in her explorations of
Christian faith, so often turns for guidance to the nonChristian, Rainer Maria Rilke. For in Rilke's poems, one
finds a steady recognition of, as well as a warning about,
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the hidden longing in the modern world to escape our
human situation. To hear some current claims about the
enhanced life awaiting us in hyperspace (by way of computers) is to understand why Rilke, early in our century,
repeatedly pointed to machines as our preferred means for
escaping the human predicament. It is really a longing, his
poems keep telling us, for processes of feeling less vulnerable and more efficient than those of the human soul.
Levertov takes her place with those artists who stay
with the tensions of the human. That stance turns out to
be not a revamped humanism, but an attempt to reopen
the issue of the holy, and of what it means in our time. She
has increasingly committed herself to the Ch~istian story,
although she remains travelling as the poet-pilgrim
through the "imagination's holy forest."
The following poem ofLevertov's can ofitselfserve as
a conclusion to this discussion-which is convenient, for I
have little idea of how to analyze the piece. It is taken from
Oblique Prayers and a sequence titled, "Of God and of the
Gods." You can find poems of Levertov that make different
sorts of assertions. But here, in this moment, even if fragmented, I think it is apparent that some new reality has
finally found her.
Of Being

I know this happiness

is provisional:
the looming presences-great suffering, great fearwithdraw only
into peripheral vision:
but ineluctable this shimmering
of wind in the blue leaves:
this flood of stillness
widening the lake of sky:
this need to dance,
this need to kneel:
this mystery:
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Two paradoxes impress me as a result of the film. The first is that teachers are simultaneously powerful and weak in their roles as educators. Teachers have great power to affect either
positively or negatively students' self-confidence or self-image. In some ways they also possess
power to shape how students will learn to think and therefore how they will see the world and
experience it. On the other hand, teachers are also weak because they are incapable of teaching certain things to certain people no matter how earnestly they try. They are also weak in
that to some extent they haven't a clue as to what they have or have not accomplished.
Another of the paradoxes explored in the film has to do with the violence of education.
The most obvious violence occurs in the course of teaching Victor language, although we
don't think of it as violence unless we compare it to the teacher's insistence that Victor wear
shoes. The shoes bring Victor into conformity, and they also give him capabilities he could
not have in bare feet. However, the shoes keep Victor from climbing trees as efficiently as
before. Language is a system of symbols which is absolutely essential for communication, and
we would be lost without it However, forcing reality into a system of symbols so as to communicate is only done at the risk of losing access to certain features of reality which the chosen
symbols of any given language do not account for . Very early in life children Jose forever the
physical capacity to see the world as someone with a completely different language is able to
see it We do well to remind ourselves that our words are a family of icons, and we must always
be vigilant lest we fall into thinking that our words alone can contain the whole of reality.
When we forget that our words unwittingly hide things from us and sometimes even rob us,
they become idols.

Frederick Niedner
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Review Essay
CHRISTIAN EDUCATION AND
THE POSTMODERN RECONFIGURATION OF PUBLIC SPACE
Lee Hardy

Schooling Christians: •Holy Experiments" in American Education
Edited by Stanley Hauerwas and John H. Westerhoff.
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992, 281 pp. + xii

This collection of essays has its origins in a consultation sponsored by the Lilly Endowment on the challenge
of Christian education in a liberal society Three essays
were added after the event for a total of eleven diverse contributions gathered into four broadly defined sections. The
first section examines the contemporary cultural context in
which the task of Christian education must be pursued. It
contains pieces by Nicholas Wolterstorff, Mark Schwehn,
and Jean Bethke Elshtain. The second section-compri~
ing essays by James Skillen, Charles and Joshua Glenn, and
Patricia Beattie Jung-brings up the question of public
education policy in America. The third takes up issues specific to Christian higher education. It features a version of
James Tunstead Burtchaell's well-known cautionary work
on patterns of secularization in church-affiliated
academies, taking Vanderbilt University as the paradigm.
This substantial study is appropriately paired with Michael
Cartwright's essay in which he articulates a rationale and
conditions for a fruitful reconnection of college and religious sponsor in the case of Allegheny College. Stanley
Hauerwas also makes a contribution in this section, point-
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ing to the challenge of telling the Christian story in a way
that makes it captive neither to oppressive ideologies nor
relativistic reactions to the same. The final section takes up
the issue of Christian formation in the church. There
Michael Warren speaks to the problem of maintaining the
integrity of the Christian gospel in a commercialized culture dominated by electronic media; and John Westerhoff,
in the concluding essay of the volume, makes specific recommendations for faith formation in the church and
parochial school.
Although many topics are explored and differing
standpoints adopted in this anthology, one of the chief and
overall theses of Schooling Christians is that the American
Christian community can no longer assume that it is well
served by the public school system. There are, of course,
many ways in which no community is well served by a great
number of our public schools, given their embarrassingly
dismal academic performance of late. This point is wellknown and widely lamented in the press. It need not be
rubbed in by the religiously inclined. But the point of this
volume is that even if students received excellent intellectual training in public schools, such schools would fail to provide the kind of education the Christian community should
desire in its principle institutions of learning. For if the
aim of education is not only the instruction of the intellect,
but the formation of character according to some particular conception of the good, the public schools in
America-as a matter of principle as well as policy-cannot
provide such an education. It is for this reason, writes John
Westerhoff, that "Christians need to question seriously
their support of public schools" (266).
In the Introduction, co-editors Hauerwas and
Westerhoff suggest that the broad support the public
school system has received to date from substantial sectors
of the Christian community stems from that community's
suppression of the deep conflict between a religious underThe Oresset

standing of life and the presuppositions of modern liberal
society (vii). The conflict might be expressed along the following lines: while a religious understanding of life naturally seeks cultural wholeness and expression in the public
realm, the ideology of modern liberalism relegates religion
to the private domain in an attempt to construct a public
square devoid of religious conviction and independent of
any particular conception of the good. In a liberal society,
all "sectarian" beliefs will be tolerated, of course-but only
if those who hold them agree that all such beliefs are equally valid and equally irrelevant to matters of public concern.
The common life is to be conducted on essentially secular
principles to which we will all subscribe and agree by virtue
of our common share in Reason.
While the demands of civility in a pluralistic society
may require that the secularizing tendencies of modern liberalism be accepted in the political domain, it is less clear
that they should be welcome in the field of education. For
when the liberal idea is extended to educational institutions of a nation under conditions of deep religious diversity, it effectively prevents diverse communities of belief from
maintaining and passing on their own traditions through
the schools. It is one thing to ask members of diverse communities not to impose their particular conception of the
good upon members of other communities through the
coercive powers of the state; it is quite another to ask them
not to communicate their deepest beliefs, ethical values,
and religious sense of existence to their own children in
the process of formal education. Although pretending to
neutrality in all matters religious, the secular vigilance of
the state in the common school puts religious communities, it seems, at a distinct disadvantage. For what they take
to be central to life is excluded from education. As a pervasive cultural ideology, liberalism tends to "undercut" traditions, as Patricia Beattie Jung points out in her essay (120).
This dynamic is nowhere more powerfully presented than in Nicholas Wolterstorff's lead article, entitled
"The Schools We Deserve." There he argues that the principle of liberalism combined with the fact of deep cultural
diversity will inevitably yield a religiously and morally vacuous education in the common school. The principle of liberalism is that no group shall impose its conception of the
good upon another group through the coercive powers of
the state. In a state sponsored common school, this principle entails that no particular conception of the good to
which anyone objects may be taught As deep cultural divisions in the States have multiplied and grown, more and
more of the common curriculum has in fact been found
objectionable. Indeed, much of the recent history of the
public schools in America has been a history of litigation,
where specifically religious and ethical elements of com-
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mon school instruction have been challenged and thrown
out because some group has found them offensive. As cultural diversity increases, the religious and ethical content ~f
the curriculum in the common school must decrease. And
rightly so: the inverse proportion necessarily follows from a
consistent and evenhanded application of the liberal principle, which is a rule of democratic fairness. The inevitable
result, however, is an education that serves no one community just because it offends no one community. "What we
each care about most deeply," Wolterstorff writes, "is
increasingly removed from public discussion as being irrelevant to the goals of the discussion" (21).
Here Wolterstorff strikes a chord that resonates
throughout the anthology. "In the United States over
recent decades" write Charles and Joshua Glenn in their
essay on religion and public education, "there has been an
attempt to render public schools inoffensive to all parents
by progressively removing from curriculum and school life
any elements to which there could be any objection from
any quarter" (96). "As a consequence [of the liberal principle in a situation of cultural conflict]," notes Westerhoff,
"nothing that any particular ethnic, racial, cultural, or religious group care strongly about will be introduced into a
school curriculum unless there is consensus, or the others
do not object, or it can be introduced in an 'objective-comparative' manner" (265). Where public schools "have been
drained of all flavor by the liberal ethos," Jung claims, "students, faculty, and staff alike find that they are unable to
give public witness to their deepest convictions"(l21).
But the trouble with liberal principle in the common school, Wolterstorff contends, goes deeper still. In its
consistent application under conditions of deep cultural
diversity, the liberal principle comes into conflict with
itself. For it is in accordance with the conception of the
good on the part of some parents that their children be
instructed in the virtues and beliefs consonant with that
conception in school as well as at home. Yet the presence
of a particular kind of religious and moral instruction in
the common school would violate the rights of parents who
might wish to have their children instructed along other
lines. The liberal solution to this potential conflict is to
enforce silence on the matter and delete any element of
instruction any one group finds offensive or repugnant.
But this strategy is not as neutral as it may seem. For, as
Jung points out, "character is shaped by what is omitted
from a curriculum as well as what is blatantly endorsed
within it. Thus a liberal education is far from substantively
neutral. It actually favors secularism and cultural assimilation" (117). If we remain committed both to the liberal
principle and to the common school in a situation of deep
cultural diversity, then we will be unavoidably confronted
with the irony of a society founded on the notion that each
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should be free to pursue his or her own vision of the good,
and yet, as Wolterstorff puts it, "thinks its continuance
depends on pressuring parents into sending their children
to schools where something other than their vision of the
good is taught" (27).
If, in a liberal society, the common school fails the
communities it pretends to serve under conditions of deep
cultural diversity, what is the solution? It is unlikely that
present cultural diversity will disappear of its own accord in
the near future, and surely we cannot eliminate it by coercion without violating the code of civility to which any
morally well-formed person should want to subscribe. We
must then, Wolterstorff asserts, give up on the idea of a
common school and provide equitable public support to
diverse communities for the education of their children as
they see fit. To do so would entail reversing the precedent
set by U.S. Supreme Court decisions that have consistently
interpreted the doctrine of the separation of church and
state to mean that no public support can be given to any
religious instruction to which anyone objects. This precedent takes its cue from the Jeffersonian slant of Virginia
statute law, but it is in no way entailed by the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. A
public policy of equal support, if any support, for religiously informed education is entirely consistent with the rule of
democratic fairness as expressed in the latter. And such a
policy, Wolterstorff argues, would effectively resolve the
antinomy generated by the application of the principle of
liberalism to the field of education.
Here again Wolterstorffs position anticipates a
point of agreement on the part of several contributors. In
his essay, "Living by Principle in a Complex Social Order,"
James Skillen argues that the government should relinquish its monopoly on publicly supported schools and treat
families as the principal parties responsible in education.
Respecting parental choice means that "public moni es
would flow with proportionate equity to self-confessed religious schools as well as to secularized schools, to schools
not related to the government as well as to government
schools" (85).
In "Making Room for Religious
Conviction," Charles andJoshua Glenn claim that "the only
way to have elementary schools that can truly educate
through dealing seriously with the profound stuff of life,
while avoiding paralyzing conflict over the basis and content of this education, is to encourage a real diversity
among schools, based upon parent and teacher choice
among meaningful alternatives" ( 112) .
The contributors to this volume are not in agreement on all matters, howe ver. As Hauerwas and
Westerhoff state in the Introduction, the essays collected in
this volume represent no single positio n. This is due in
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part, they maintain, because "the authors have quite different interpretations of the nature ofliberalism and the challenge it presents"(ix). Indeed, in this volume we can find a
spectrum of attitudes towards the liberal idea. At one end
we have sweeping condemnations of modern liberal society
as inherently secularizing and, moreover, dissembling in
that it portrays itself as neutral with respect to particular
traditions of belief when in fact it is itself a particular tradition of belief (Hauerwas, Skillen). At the other end we
find proposals to take some version of the liberal idea as a
principle for the organization of church-affiliated colleges
(Cartwright), or to convert classroom teaching into a form
of democratic drama (Elshtain). Yet there may be more of
a consensus position in the works than the editors would
lead us to believe.
To isolate this position, it might be helpful to
make a provisional distinction between the ideal of a liberal polity and the ideology of liberalism. According to
Alasdair Maclntrye-surely one of liberalism's strongest
critics-the aim of the "liberal project" is to create a society
in which people "who espouse widely different and incompatible conceptions of the good life" can "live together
peaceably within the same society, enjoying the same political status and engaging in the same economic relationships." (Whose Justice? Which Rationality 7 336) Given the
fact that many nations are in fact composed of people who
differ widely in just these respects, it is difficult to know why
one would want to reject such a political ideal. None of the
authors in this anthology have taken it upon themselves to
criticize the ideal of a liberal polity where a basic roster of
rights is extended to all citizens irrespective of creed.
Most, if not all, of the authors seem prepared to accept
some version of liberal polity as the appropriate institutional umbrella under which the task of education in a pluralistic society must be carried out.
What most of the authors find problematic, however, is the ideology of liberalism by which our polity has
been founded and secured. Although this ideology is
somewhat amorphous and subject to various interpretations, it includes several identifiable core components: a
contractarian political philosophy, whereby the chief task
of government is construed as the maintenance of a framework of rights within which autonomous individuals can
pursue their particular versions of the good with the maximal amount of freedom consistent with the freedom of others to do the same; an Enlightenment conviction that
universally shared human reason will provide an adequate
base of general principles for the common life of society;
and the related conviction that civil concord is best served
by relegating non-rational, tradition-based beliefs and practices to the domain of private life. A liberal society, then,
will gladly tolerate such differences between people as
The Cnsstt

admit of no rational adjudication--on the condition that
they make no real difference. In private we can believe
and do what we like; in public we must shed our differences and appeal only to what we hold in common.
While the first component of the ideology of liberalism is closely tied to the ideal of a liberal polity that few
are willing to reject out of hand, the second component
has been largely discredited by the postmodem realization
that, as Jung put it, "the search for a foundation for the
moral life that would prove to be persuasive to all rational
human beings has dead-ended. This project," she maintains, "failed because it demanded of its participants that
they deny their particularity-their traditions and communities-and adopt an abstract, ahistorical, impartial point
of view. Such a request is ultimately impossible to fulfill. It
rests on a misleading epistemology: no such non-perspectival position is attainable"(ll9). If it is the case that the
moral life can be sustained only in the soil of a tradition
made credible by narrative, then the ideology of liberalism
is rightly rejected as an educational liability. Moreover, the
idea of a common school as a tradition-free zone of instruction looks decidedly less attractive. Coherent moral education will be best conducted within a particular tradition
rather than apart from all traditions. Better a plurality of
schools free to draw upon the full resources of a rich and
finely textured conception of the good than one common
school with a curriculum thinned out to the level of public
consensus.
The method of liberal tolerance-the third component-is built on the modernist assumptions of the second component and therefore draws its share of fire as
well. The liberal project of tolerance was to construct a
clean, open, and expansive public square based on rational
consensus, while all weirdness and particularity is shuffied
off and consigned to private chambers. In a liberal society,

people would be free to hold to any tradition-bound beliefs
they like, as long as they agree not to act on them in public.
But if the modernist presumption of common reason that
underlies this method is itself a constituent of a particular
tradition-the western Enlightenment tradition-then the
pretense to neutrality on the part of liberal tolerance
begins to look more like a stratagem with a definite secular
bias. The self-appointed referee turns out to be a contestant in disguise. While the ideology of liberalism privileges
itself in the public realm to the disadvantage of all religious
traditions, it cannot make itself plausible without recourse
to its own particular Enlightenment narrative.
Although a number of contributors explicitly reject
the liberal method of tolerance, it should be pointed out
that they do not reject the ideal of tolerance as such. In
fact, what they intend to propose is a more consistent form
of tolerance, a form of tolerance free of the antinomy mentioned above. Rather than merely permitting religious
expression in private life, such tolerance would encourage
religious expression in the public realm as well; rather than
marginalizing religious traditions and communities, it
would seek to make room for them in the common life of
the nation; rather than admitting persons into the public
square on the condition that they leave their differences
behind, it would allow them to enter as whole persons to
find what agreement they can without sacrificing their
identity. This alternative understanding of the relationship
between the liberal polity and tradition-bound communities would allow distinctive communities to interact with
each other in the public square "in ways that do not compromise their integrity, but make possible various and
diverse contribution to our common life"(x). Consensus
would no longer be sought on the basis of a common, tradition-free reason, but rather in the overlap of particular
traditions. Such a postmodern reconfiguration of public
space is not a rejection of the ideal of tolerance; rather, as

I would not say that Victor is team-taught when he is brought under the tutelage of M. ltard and Mme.
Guerin, but I did think, when I saw the film, that it was advantageous for Victor to have two teachers,
M. Itard functioning as the curriculum developer and disciplinarian, Mme. Guerin serving as the counselor and nurturer. So I immediately leaped to the conclusion that I could be a better teacher ifl had
an assistant like Mme. Guerin . Perhaps, however, I simply need to combine these qualities in my own
teaching: to combine discipline with reward, sternness with gentleness, rigor with compassion, and
authority with openness. If I cannot stay open to the sheer wonder of the "wild child" in my students, I
suspect I can neither teach nor learn.

Arlin G. Meyer
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Skillen rightly contends, it represents a more jealous adherence to that ideal in that it "allows for greater tolerance
than does liberalism" (85-86).
If the ideology of liberalism suffers from an errant
epistemology and a masked particularity that makes its
promise of consensus empty and its form of tolerance
repressive, then its prompt rejection could come as an ironic benefit to a liberal polity such as ours. For a liberal polity-insofar as it is republican-depends upon the civic
virtue of its citizens for its political health and long term
viability. If such virtue is best nurtured by narrative and
cared for in community-and would soon grow flaccid
were it uprooted and transported to the thinner climes of
abstract principles--then it behooves the liberal polity not
to frustrate but to foster those communities that in turn
foster the virtue of its citizens. Furthermore, if the fundamental thesis of Mark Schwehn's essay is correct, religiously
based communities might also serve as an asset rather than
a liability for the educational enterprise as well. Schwehn
rightly notes than much of recent reflection in epistemology has pointed to the communal character of human
inquiry. If this is indeed the case, he argues, then it is
entirely natural to think that virtues of character-like
faith, humility, and self-denial-will play a crucial role in
the advance of knowledge. For such virtues make us into
the kind of people who can learn with and from others. As
religion has served as a traditional source of support for
just such virtues, making sense of them in the narrative it
tells and cultivating them in the practices it recommends, it
follows that religion can play a positive role in establishing
the kind of ethical environment in which learning can
flourish.
The promotion of civic virtue and the creation of
ethical learning environments are contributions to society
that religiously based communities can make-when they
are at their best. But frequently they are not. Throughout
the anthology there is remarkably little attention paid to
the downside of communities as defined by religious orientation-the propensity of such communities to close in
upon themselves, to develop embattled outlooks upon a
world they have not bothered to understand, to become
centers of willful ignorance, suspicion and hatred of the
other, to become-in short-sources of the kind of vicious
civil conflict that called forth the idea of a liberal society in
the first place. Schwehn mentions the problem of tribalism
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(38),jung wants to avoid the dilemma of "exclusively liberal or rigidly traditional forms of moral education" (115),
and Cartwright faults the "Christian college" that tends to
confirm itself in its own errors by exchanging genuine dialogue for a "monological" culture (206). But on the whole
the problem of striking a balance between passing on a
rich and finely textured conception of the good to the next
generation with conviction while at the same time encouraging an openness to self-critique and transformation
receives proportionally little by way of sustained attention
in this collection of essays on the problem of Christian education.
But this is not too surprising, given the nature of
the consultation. The authors were invited to address the
problem of Christian education primarily on the political
level. Here the basic units of analysis are societies, institutions, and contesting principles; the basic division is
between "us" (the Christian community) and "it" (liberal
society); and the basic point is change, alteration, and
reform. Thus ambiguity goes by the boards, as clarion calls
for action require a more decisive and unnuanced partitioning of the social terrain than might otherwise be
allowed. For this very reason parents, who must make decisions about the education of their children this side of
sweeping societal change, will find little practical guidance
in this volume. In reality, pros and cons exist on both sides
of the fence that divides public and private education. Not
all public schools are in the desperate moral straits many of
the contributors to this anthology would have them ineven if, as a matter of principle, they should be in such
straits. Nor are all parochial schools paragons of religious
formation, even if they intend to be. Thus the polarized
and highly generalized discourse addressed to institutional
change agents concerning "liberal society," the "state of
education in America today," and the "Christian community" will probably not be helpful for parents charged with
the education of their children in any concrete and necessarily complex situation. What stands before them is this
particular child and that particular school. For them, the
challenge of "schooling Christians" in a liberal society will
involve making careful assessments of the combined influences of a particular church, school, home, neighborhood,
and media culture-and often negotiating uneasy tradeoffs between the positive and negative factors present in
each of them-even if they are otherwise occupied in pressing for just the kind of institutional changes recommended
by some of the contributors to this provocative volume. 0
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Learning,
Believing,
Being,
Doing
Mark R. Schwehn, Exiles from Eden:
Religion and the Academic Vocation in
America. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993. xiv + 143 pages.
Mark Schwehn's project in this
urbane book is to argue for "a religiously informed reconception of the
academic vocation in particular and of
academic life in general" (x). The
rhetoric of most recent books about
higher education is that of aggressive
stridency and their ethos is that of
unfair spitefulness. Schwehn's book is
refreshingly free of both!
Schwehn observes that those who
write about academia regularly cite
three objectives for the academic
enterprise: "making knowledge, transmitting knowledge and skills, and
helping students learn how to lead
more ethical, fulfilling lives" ( 4).
These objectives are often regarded as
being in opposition to each other;
and, of the three, the objective of
"making knowledge" has acquired
hegemony, in the sense that when an
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academic speaks of "doing my own
work," it is this that he or she has in
mind, and in the sense that esteem in
academia depends largely on how
one 's peers evaluate one's contribution to this objective.
Schwehn takes Max Weber's
famous speech delivered near the end
of his life at the University of Munich,
"Science as a Vocation" ("Wissenschaft
als Beruf'), as a paradigmatic statement
of this view that the advance of
Wissenschaft constitutes the essence of
the academic vocation. What he singles out from this address, apart from
its central claim, is Weber's emphasis
on the inevitable specialization of
Wissenschaft in the modern world,
Weber's emphasis on the disciplined
self-mastery required of all who aim to
advance Wissenschaft, Weber's insistence that the pursuit of Wzssenschaft is
to be value-free, and Weber's emphasis
on the loneliness of all those who
advance Wissenschaft.
No doubt part of what motivates
Schwehn 's attempt at "reconception"
is the wish to alleviate the unhappiness
and dis-ease which the hegemony of
the Weberian model has produced in
the modern academy. What he
emphasizes, however, is not that; but
rather, what he sees as an alteration in
fundamental epistemology which has
occurred over the last couple of
decades, from the "foundationalism"
or "objectivism" of Weber's implicit
epistemology to the view
that
knowledge of the truth emerges from

.the disciplined inquiry of communities
and that beliefs are justified by reference to the standards of communities.
"[C]ommunitarian accounts of knowledge and truth have undermined the
epistemology that informed Weber's
conception of the academic calling,"
he says (40). He takes Richard Rorty
and Parker Palmer as exemplars of the
new epistemology.
Schwehn proposes, in the light of
this new epistemology, that instead of
thinking of the university as an institution enabling individuals to pursue
Wissenschaft, we think of universities
(and colleges) as communities of
inquiry into the truth. He is sensitive
to the fact that universities never, and
colleges seldom, constitute a single
community. Universities are, however,
collections of communities of inquiry.
Schwehn proceeds from this
point to discuss the virtues required
for the existence of communities of
enquiry; it is especially here that religion enters his picture; "I believe," he
says, "that the most promising argument for an integral relationship
between religion and higher education
can be made through a demonstration
that the practice of certain spiritual
virtues is and has always been essential
to the process of learning, even with
the secular academy" ( 41). The
virtues which he emphasizes are humility, faith, self-denial, charity, and
friendship.
In summary, "This reorientation
of academic life entails at least three
39

radical revisions of the Web~rian conception of the academic calling. First,
teaching, not Wissenschafl, becomes the
activity in terms of which all others publication, collegiality, research, consultation, advising-are to be
understood,
interpreted,
and
appraised. Second, the cultivation of
those spiritual virtues that make genuine teaching and learning possible
becomes a vitally important aspect of
pedagogy. Finally, both charity and
philia, the loves that Weber banished
from the academy, become once again
central to its self-conception and to its
overall mission in the world" (58-59).
Schwehn concludes his discussion by asking whether perhaps there
is "a peculiarly modern and secular
spirituality that gives a deep measure
of meaning to the academic vocation
as Weber described it and at the same
time blinds its practitioners to their
own necessary reliance upon virtues
that are distinctively religious" (95).
He imaginatively uses an analysis of
Henry Adams' The Education of Henry
Adams to suggest that what underlies
the modem Weberian academy is the
conviction that if there is to be meaning in our lives, we must make meaning.
This bare-bones outline of
Schwehn's argument gives no sense of
the richness of his discussion nor of
the wisdom present in many passages.
Indeed, I think that arguably the finest
passage in the book is an aside (p.
29ff) in which he observes that "the
principal dangers inherent in communitarianism are tribalism and the subsequent violence that often arises
among rival tribes .... objectivism arose
initially and ... it subsequently attained
cultural dominion primarily because it
was intended by its architects as a way
of avoiding violence." I have offered
this outline, however, because I wish to
pay to Schwehn's argument the tribute
of engaging it. There can be no doubt
that the academy in the West is undergoing, and must undergo, fundamental alterations in direction and
self-understanding. Schwehn's book is
a significant contribution to the necessary debate.
But I have my doubts, here and
there. In the first place, about
40

Schwehn's characterization of Weber.
Schwehn rather often contrasts
Weber's view with his own as striving for
mastery over the world through calculation
and control versus seeking the truth of matters (cf. 58). I doubt that this is fair to
Weber. In that same speech, of which
Schwehn rightly makes much, Weber
says that the goal of the academic is "to
state facts." On my reading, Weber
did not see the academy as in the service of technological interests. His
impulse was always to say that each
sphere of culture or society has its own
interior logic. He did, indeed, see
"instrumental rationality" as pervading
the modern academy as it does all
other spheres. But what he had in
mind is that the modern academic
repudiates habit and impulse in favor
of a rationalized disciplined pursuit of
the goals of the academy-namely, "to
state facts."
Furthermore, Schwehn interprets
Weber's conception of the academic
calling "as a transmutation, sometimes
a subversion, of terms that were religious in origin and implication" (40).
But this too seems to me not quite on
target. Weber argued that what got
our modern world going was the
explicitly religious notion of working in
a calling. But he also held that now
that it is going, it is self-perpetuating
without any appeal to religion .
Religious terms and values are not so
much transmuted and subverted as
simply left behind!
Secondly, I read the recent hist<?
ry of epistemology somewhat differently from Schwehn. There has indeed
been a demise of foundationalism.
But I think the decisive blows were not
delivered by the communitarians but
by the historians of natural science
who, by studying in detail great
episodes in the history of modern science, succeeded in persuading us that
if there is such a thing as "the logic" of
science, that logic is not a foundationalist logic. Once that point was made,
other aspects of the regnant self-image
of the academy came unstuck. In particular, what came unstuck was the traditional view that the learning of the
academy is to be a generically human
enterprise. We now are all familiar,

and more or less comfortable, with
such notions as feminist philosophy
and black history and liberation theology and third-world sociology-all of
which would be anathema to the
Enlightenment. Schwehn, it appears
to me, still holds to the ideal of the
learning of the academy as a generically human enterprise; his argument is
that we have to conceive of that enterprise as accomplished in communities
of inquiry. I think that what is happening today is something much more
radical: We are seeing the rise and
affirmation of avowedly particularist,
perspectivalist learning. It's not just
that learning takes place in communities; rather, one's learning unavoidably
and justifiedly reflects the perspective
of one's community.
Thirdly, I have some hesitations
about Schwehn's way of seeing the
bearing of religion on the "new academy." The "self-conscious cultivation of
a spiritually informed ethos on
inquiry" is what he calls for (45); and
he sees the spiritual as informing the
inquiry at the point of those requisite
virtues of humility, faith, self-denial,
charity, and friendship. He calls them
"spiritual virtues." But in what sense
are they spiritual? They are spiritual in
their origin, he says; he sees them as
emerging from the religion of the
Hebrews. And they are spiritual, he
speculates, in that ultimately they may
well need religion for their sustenance.
He admits, though, that as a matter of
fact one might have these virtues and
be resolutely anti-religious; he cites
Jeffrey Stout as a paradigmatic example. Furthermore, once one sees what
these virtues actually come to, it's not
clear that Judaism contributed essentially to their presence among us.
Friendship was praised by Aristotle.
And as to faith, which consists for
Schwehn of relying "upon the work
and the thought of others," the great
Enlightenment figure, Thomas Reid,
made what seems to me the right
point: Human life would be impossible
without such reliance, be it a religious
or a non-religious life.
In short, I think Schwehn is right
to see in the new "communitarianism"
new possibilities for the role of reliThe Cresset

gion in the academy. But I see these
now possibilities not so much in Rorty
and Palmer, as in the flowering of perspectivalism in the contemporary
academy. May it be that the religious
person has a distinct perspective on reality
which ought to be contributed to the
pluralist dialogue of the academy?
May it be that he or she has distinct
things to say in the dialogue, and not
just distinct contributions to make to
the character-formation necessary to
keep the dialogue going?
On the other hand, let us not forget Schwehn's comment about communitarianism and violence: Keeping
the dialogue going will prove to be no
mean feat!
Nicholas Wolterstorff

Edward LeRoy Long, Jr., Higher
Education as A Moral Enterprise.
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown
University Press; 1992. xv + 221 pages.
Perhaps the most common justification proffered for church-related
and independent Christian colleges is
their attention to values. It is implied,
and sometimes straightforwardly
asserted, that faculty at public universities care less about the moral life of
students and that the curriculum and
the ethos of a public or independent
college or university is less conducive
to moral formation than that of the
church-related university. Having
received my graduate degree from one
state university and having taught at
another, I know these claims about the
moral inferiority of the species "state
university" to be false. In Higher
Education as A Moral Enterprise, Edward
LeRoy Long, Jr. effectively demonstrates that every university (state-supported,
independent,
or
church-related) can have and ought to
have morality as the foundation for
their mission and self-understanding.
Moral commitment is not what distinguishes the church-related university
from other universities, but what
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should distinguish the university, per
se, from other institutions.
Defining the educational mission
of the university in terms of orthopraxy,
rather than orthodoxy or orthognosis,
Long argues that the purpose of the
university is neither to transmit a body
of correct beliefs nor to convey to students "what every well-educated person should know," but rather to be a
properly-functioning community
charged with three primary tasks:
"(1) ... the identification, maturation,
and enrichment of selfhood ... (2) ... the
discoveryI construction, extension, and
dissemination of knowledge and culture ... ( 3) the responsibility for the
well-being of society" ( 6).
Long's goal, then, is to explain
the procedures which will ensure the
accomplishment of these tasks, to
identifY the moral values which must
be present in individuals and in communities if the university is to meet
with success in its proper function.
And it is when he turns his attention to
these procedural matters that Long's
book is richest, rich not only in terms
of insight, but in language which pithily identifies inadequate educational
approaches. For example, in criticizing the emphasis upon competency
testing, Long writes, "But efforts to
hone competence apart from the cultivation of moral selfhood can make
"the best and the brightest" into merely the smartest and the most scheming" ( 21).
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Academics tend to think that the
classroom is the most important locus
for fulfilling the university's mission,
but Long wisely points out that attention to selfhood requires equal concern about noncurricular life, about
the living conditions of students, the
smaller communities students are a
part of, their access to cultural events,
the type of play the university encourages, etc.
With respect to the responsibility
to discoverI construct, extend, and disseminate knowledge and culture,
orthopraxy requires an acknowledgement that, certainty being beyond our
grasp, we do well to emphasize openness, dialogue, and modesty. Elegance
and maturity, rather than "correctness," reign as the norms for assessment of theories. "Investigative"
research may not be regarded as the
only legitimate research, but "dialogic"
research and "interpretative" research,
research much more akin to the teaching process, are to be valued as well.
The university fulfills its responsibility for the well-being of society by
recognizing the impossibility of a
morally neutral university and then
seeking avenues for expressing social
concern that are "indigenous to its
own nature and compatible with its
mandate." For Long this means that
the university must influence society by
means of its moral credibility. This
credibility will be expressed in the university's training students in the skills
that make our life together possible, in
the rigorous examination of social
problems, in the way a university treats
its employees and responds to social
needs in its immediate community, in
the way a university is morally governed.
There are nuggets of practical
wisdom throughout this book. I can
think of few university administrators
and faculty who would not find this
book to be quite rewarding reading.
But, finally, I doubt whether the foundations Long has provided can bear
the weight of the moral structure Long
builds. Long gives us a liberal university, a university which, to a great extent,
mirrors the liberal polity of which it is
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a part. Thus, his emphasis throughout
the book, is upon procedural, rather
than substantive, morality. In the
absence of knowledge about what is
morally good, the university can, nevertheless, be a community engaged in
morally sound activities of the formation of "selfhood," in discovering and
extending knowledge, in attending to
the well-being of society. But, in the
absence of some shared concept of the
good, in the absence of substantive
moral knowledge, can the university
agree about what kind of self the university should form? about what kind
of knowledge is important? about
what will contribute to the well-being
of society?
Perhaps, though it is unlikely. I
am convinced that our answers to
these questions will be far too thin to
be intellectually and morally satisfying.
We may be able to identity and form
or convey the kind of self and the kind
of knowledge a liberal polity values; we
may be able to identity what it looks
like for the university to be moral in a

society in which we share no common
concept of the good. But whether
these can sustain the commitment of
any but the moral atheletes among us,
I doubt.
It is precisely here that there
could be a difference between the lilr
eral university and a church-related
university with a self-consciously nonliberal conception of the good. Such a
church-related university could articulate its own conception of the good
and the grounds for thinking its conception superior to alternative conceptions. Those students who share that
conception of the good could be initiated into the pursuit of the good in
that community and the curricular
and noncurricular life of the community as a whole structured around the
pursuit of that good in a university setting. Those students who do not share
the university's concept of the good
would nevertheless benefit from the
opportunity of listening and observing
a community in pursuit of the good, as
well as from the knowledge conveyed

and skills gained from any adequate
university education. A church-related
university might differ from other universities in its bold articulation of a
good far more substantive than the
procedural good of a liberal university
and in its willingness to form a common life consistent with the good. But
those church-related colleges and universities whose conception of the good
is so thin as to closely resemble that of
the liberal university will have to find
some justification other than moral
superiority for their claim upon potential students. For, as Long ably argues,
all universities can and ought to
understand education as a moral
enterprise. Long has provided the lilr
eral university with a great deal of
practical wisdom to guide the pursuit
of moral excellence. Those who are
resigned to a liberal conception of the
good, as well as those whose conception of the good is much thicker, can
learn a great deal from Long's reflections upon the university.
Thomas D. Kennedy
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Raphael
Raphael's wings are gold, an airy gold that thins
to transparency like sun falling on a wall
and yet are deep and wide as sun taking
a field full in the morning or
leaving wheat in the evening. When he flies
away, they are a
streak of salmon or
carmine along the edge of
the sea, and where his feet touch
last, whitecaps rise to rollers and throw
themselves in ecstatic, bright hosannas
over and over against the eroding shore.

Two Poems by

Robert Siegel

How to Catch a Poem
It begins with one leaf rubbing against another,
a light, a rift in the clouds, the weight of a feather
spiraling down, a ripple on waterits shape rising from the dark and fusing
with a sound, a touch, a peculiar scent. Now it begins
to show plumage, the gleam of a pelt, pausing
to stare with an ebony eye. One twitch-it's gone,
fled into that darker wood behind the eyes. Stunned,
you trace its tracks on paper, stumble,
pick yourself up and go down each sly
cheat of a path vanishing in a thicket, lie
still, listening for its breath, a twig breaking
where you think ... Avoid food or sleep, follow all day,
at night listen for its cry under the moon. Finally, you may
gather enough to show its presence. Delay
finishing what you have. Take your time. Return home
and frame the cast of its footprint: that is the poem.
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The Lilly Fellows Program in Humanities and the Arts, established in 1991, addresses two critical
problems faced by church-related institutions of higher learning in the United States. First, though
many church-related colleges and universities are seeking to recover or refortify a sense of purpose and
identity, there has been no sustained national conversation expressly designed to renew and deepen a
sense of corporate vocation among these schools. Second, settings for the formation of younger
scholars who wish to pursue their vocational commitments at church-related colleges and universities
scarcely exist in the United States. In brief, the hegemony of the secular research university has
gradually eroded both institutional and individual senses of Christian vocation, leaving many schools
and many Christian scholars in need of renewed vision and mutual support.
The Lilly Fellows Program therefore consists of two distinct but integrated programmatic initiatives.
First, it has established and will steadily expand a national network of church-related institutions of
higher learning and sustain among them a discussion of Christian understandings of the nature of the
academic vocation. The network represents a diversity of denominational traditions, institutional types,
and geographical locations . Representatives from the network institutions meet at Valparaiso
University for an annual fall conference. Additionally, several workshops and mini-conferences are
scheduled annually on the campuses of the network institutions. A biannual newsletter reports network
activities, provides listings of young scholars interested in teaching at church-related institutions, and
includes reports from conferences and workshops.
Second, the Lilly Fellows Program offers young scholars in the humanities and the arts a chance to
renew and deepen their sense of vocation, and to enrich their postdoctoral intellectual and spiritual life
within a Christian community of learning. Each academic year three Postdoctoral Fellows are
appointed for two-year periods, selected from candidates interested in considering the relationship
between Christianity and the academic vocation . The Fellows are prepa.·ed, through a variety of
teaching experiences, through participation in a weekly colloquium, and through regular association
with mentors, to seek permanent employment within church-related institutions of higher learning.
The Program also sponsors one Senior Fellow, selected from nominees from the network schools, to
spend the year on the Valparaiso University campus, working closely with the Ully Fellows Program.
The Senior Fellow engages in research and writing, is a resource person for the Postdoctoral Fellows,
participates in a year-long colloquium, and contributes to the annual conference the following fall .
These initiatives bring focus, clarity, and energy to a critical aspect of a much larger project: the
imaginative reformulation and implementation of an agenda for church-related higher learning for the
twenty-frrst century.
For more information about the Lilly Fellows Program in Humanities and the Arts, contact:
Arlin G. Meyer, Program Director
Lilly Fellows Program in Humanities and the Arts
Valparaiso University
Valparaiso, Indiana 46383
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